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Summary 
This chapter starts from the premise that some 80 percent of the world’s population 
affirms some kind of religious identification, a percentage that is growing rather than 
declining. Emphasizing the significance of belief and practice in everyday lives and local 
contexts, we analyze the impact of religion and its relevance to social progress in a wide 
variety of fields: family, gender, and sexuality; diversity and democracy; conflict and peace; 
everyday wellbeing; and care for the earth. We also identify a series of cross-cutting themes 
that establish a foundation for policy-making.4 
In the Introduction, we set out our overall goal, which is to provide ways to assess 
the nature and significance of religion in the specific local contexts in which social progress 
is pursued. Careful assessment includes attention to everyday practices, not just official 
doctrines. We demonstrate that religion—as identity, practice, belief, and membership -- is 
integral to the social lives of a vast portion of the world’s population. Religion is in itself a 
cultural good; thus, social progress must include nurturing spaces in which individuals and 
collectivities can pursue religious ends.  
Section 16.2 on “Family, gender, and sexuality” affirms that domestic and gendered 
relationships have always been shaped by religious rules, rituals, and prohibitions. Here we 
offer tools for assessing both religious obstacles and the potential for partnership in the quest 
for progress in these most basic of social locations. Setting aside a lingering binary between 
secular progress and religious reaction is the first step. A burgeoning literature reveals a 
strong defense of the nuclear family on the part of some religious organizations, but also 
progressive reinterpretations and tactical uses of existing tradition on the part of others.  
                                                        
4 We also wish to thank Kira Ganga Kieffer, Boston University, for constructing our bibliography, Caleb South, 
Princeton University, for a very helpful early reading, and Adam Westbrook, Boston University, for his careful 
proofreading and design of the article for this web posting, along with Cécile Laborde and Gerrie ter Haar for 
especially helpful comments. 
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Section 16.3 deals with “Religion, diversity, and democracy,” demonstrating the 
range of religious ecologies that arise from population movement and media connections. As 
multiple religious communities encounter each other, the goal remains constant: to discover 
how religiously diverse people learn to flourish in each other’s company. This implies the 
development of governing structures that are accountable to, and representative of their 
citizens. We consider different understandings of multiculturalism and secularism, in addition 
to democracy itself, noting that religious traditions themselves have capacities to promote 
democratic governance. Not least, “street-level ecumenism” (pragmatic cooperative activity) 
is often more effective than a dialogue between religious or secular elites. 
Section 16.4 is concerned with “Religion, conflict, and peace.” A clear conclusion 
emerges: religion is neither inherently violent nor inherently peaceful, but includes practices, 
beliefs, values, and institutions that can lead in either direction. A careful assessment of the 
particular context and the particular religions in play is likely to enhance social progress. 
Close attention is paid to sites—geographical, political, and social—of potential destructive 
violence and effective peace-making. The sometimes tense relations between human rights 
and religion are central to the discussion. 
Section 16.5 turns in a different direction to examine the many dimensions of 
“Everyday wellbeing: Economy, education, health, and development.” We argue that 
economic wellbeing, education, and healthcare are goals shared by religious groups and are 
often woven into religious worldviews. That said, there are many places where religious ideas 
and practices are at odds with secular norms. Finding common ground is difficult, but well-
chosen partnerships can vastly extend the reach of programs that enhance wellbeing. States, 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), faith communities, and religiously-infused local 
cultures all have a role to play.  
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Section 16.6 is concerned with “Care for the earth” itself, recognizing that religious 
understandings of the earth and faith-based activism on behalf of the environment share much 
with secular groups. Effective partnerships enhance the capacities of the diverse players in 
this field. More profoundly, at least some faith communities assert a moral stance which 
contests the very framing of “environment-as-resource” in global capitalist society, 
challenging thereby entrenched systems of power, knowledge, and technology.  
Section 16.7, entitled “Themes and implications: An action toolkit” captures the 
essence of the chapter. It starts by drawing the threads of the chapter together in five 
interconnected themes: the persistence of religion in the twenty-first century; the importance 
of context in discerning outcomes—underlining the role of social science in this; the urgent 
need for enhanced cultural competence and improved religious literacy; the significance of 
religion in initiating change; and—especially—the benefits of well-judged partnerships. Each 
of these themes concludes with an action toolkit.  
In sum, we argue that researchers and policy makers pursuing social progress will 
benefit from careful attention to the power of religious ideas to motivate, of religious 
practices to shape ways of life, of religious communities to mobilize and extend the reach of 
social change, and of religious leaders and symbols to legitimate calls to action. The 
continuing need for critical but appreciative assessment and the demonstrable benefits of 
creative partnerships are our stand-out findings. 
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16.1. Introduction 
The pursuit of social progress and human flourishing is inevitably intertwined with 
religion. Well over 80 percent of the world’s population is connected to some sort of religion, 
a percentage that is growing rather than declining.5 The consequences of those connections 
and commitments are, however, enormously varied, at least in part because the connections 
themselves are widely different in intensity and character. This chapter provides a guide to 
that variation and impact.  
Most religious adherents, even nominal ones, see their religious traditions as a basic 
good, providing blessings to themselves and others. In the very places where social and 
political life is most precarious, religious communities can provide key protections and forms 
of self-help; and in the most comfortable of places, religious communities often become sites 
of celebration and solidarity. At the same time, religious movements, communities and 
leaders can present important obstacles to progressive change. Understanding the variety of 
contributions and challenges presented by religion is essential to work for social progress. 
Neither good nor ill can be assumed at the outset. Analyzing existing evidence regarding the 
conditions and consequences of specific religious configurations will be a primary task of this 
chapter. 
We will argue that religions can play a distinctive role in reaching and mobilizing 
portions of the population not always well-supported by governmental or economic 
institutions. Thus the pervasive grassroots presence of religious leaders and collectivities is a 
critical resource for those seeking change. This observation is paired with a second theme 
                                                        
5 The peak year for non-religious populations is 1970. Since then, religions of all kinds have been growing, 
including Christianity in Eastern Europe and sub-Saharan Africa, Buddhism and other religions in China, and 
Islam in the Middle East and Africa. These trends are driven in part by non-religious people converting, but 
mostly they are a consequence of standard demographic forces such as births and deaths. Despite shrinking 
populations of Christian believers in Western Europe and North America, these forces are likely to result in 
sustained religious growth globally through 2050 (Johnson, Grim, and Zurlo 2016).  
6 
 
that will run through this chapter. The goals and methods of secular change agents may not 
always match perfectly with the goals and methods of religious organizations, a fact that must 
be recognized from the start. But in most contexts there are areas where creative partnerships 
are possible, many of which can be highly productive.  
We begin this introductory section by thinking carefully about the nature of religion 
itself and its relation to things deemed secular. A narrow focus on official doctrines and 
memberships is not sufficient for current religious circumstances, especially beyond Europe 
and North America. That broader scope—looking seriously at everyday religious life across 
the globe—will call into question the modern assumptions both that secularization is 
inevitable and that it is a necessary path to progress. Indeed, as Chapter 15 has made clear, 
assumptions based in a modernization narrative are often obstacles that blind scientists to the 
agency and creativity of social actors. 
These assumptions are not easily shed, however. Social science itself was birthed with 
ideas about religion and secularization at its core, and as the modern social sciences 
developed in post-Enlightenment Europe, it seemed natural to speak of religion and secularity 
as occupying separate—and competing—domains. Religions were primarily understood as 
systems of belief based on supernatural assumptions and organized into major systems of 
authority and power. These were seen as standing in natural opposition to empirical, 
scientific, and political ways of understanding and ordering the world. This opposition and 
the gradual triumph of science and expertise were theorized as secularization. In Peter 
Berger’s (1969) influential statement of the theory, the forces of the modern world would 
eventually remove the necessity for supernatural explanations, and those who still believed in 
forces beyond this world could either hold those beliefs as privatized opinions or gather in 
“sheltering enclaves” with fellow believers. Religion itself would lose its ability to be a 
powerful force shaping the secular public world. 
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Even Berger himself has renounced much of the theory that bore his imprint, noting 
not only the robust presence of religious affiliation around the world, and the visibility of 
religiously-inspired political movements, but also the persistence of the most dramatically 
supernatural forms of religion alongside modern ways of knowing (Berger 2014). While 
some would describe this as a “resurgence” of religion, we prefer to argue that the old 
modernization narratives never captured the religious realities of the larger world in which 
questions of social progress must be addressed today. 
16.1.1. Defining religion and its relation to social progress 
One of the most challenging tasks in addressing the question of religion and social 
progress is establishing the terms of the conversation. Social progress, as previous chapters 
have argued, must be disentangled from its Enlightenment presumptions in order to 
encompass a broader understanding of movements toward freedom, dignity, and relationships 
of solidarity and mutual wellbeing. Once we leave aside the premise that every part of the 
world will develop along universal lines set out by Western Europe’s history, we also have to 
disentangle ideas about progress from ideas about secularity. That task begins with a careful 
reassessment of how religion is defined and identified.  
16.1.1.1 Expanding definitions of religion 
The existing social science literature depends to a large extent on research methods 
developed in North America and Europe. At their best, these encompass some of the 
complexity that characterizes the religious dimensions of society. Sophisticated survey-based 
measures are often very useful for producing a broad snapshot; but as Figure 16.1 
demonstrates, surveys can produce widely varying pictures of the same place, depending on 
which aspect of religion is taken to be most critical. 
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Figure 16.1 Measuring Religion 
 
In this chapter, when we say “religion,” we will have in mind both the very broad 
range of institutions, beliefs and practices that social scientists have typically thought of as 
religion and the much larger domain of everyday beliefs and practices that constitute lived 
religion. This means that the particular contexts and the particular challenges of people’s 
lived experience matter. Religions have their impact as a part of the life projects of 
9 
 
individuals and groups. This has several effects on how we look at religion. First, we expect 
ordinary practice to diverge from the ideas of religious professionals, in that we expect 
ordinary practitioners and religious professionals each to appropriate beliefs and practices 
that help them respond to the demands of their particular personal and institutional context 
(McGuire 2008). Religious ideas and practices are situated, meaning (among other things) 
that every religious tradition is internally diverse. They are also active and constantly 
changing. As new people enter a context through migration or new ideas are encountered 
through media, ordinary practitioners and theologians alike engage religion in active ways. 
They are not simply enacting established beliefs and rituals, but through their action, they are 
contributing to the ongoing creation and re-creation of them (Bender 2010). 
Religion as it is lived is also a very practical and material thing, not simply an 
otherworldly preoccupation. It may address this-worldly goals ranging from overcoming 
substance abuse to seeking justice, from socializing children to escaping violence (Smilde 
2007a). Daniel Levine captures well this sense of religious practice. “The lived experience of 
religion,” he writes, “is closely linked to ways of managing ordinary life.” As a result, “it is 
not just that religious beliefs spill over from neatly confined church spaces to infuse action in 
other parts of life. On close inspection, the distinction between otherworldly and this-
worldly… does not hold up very well” (Levine 2012: 8).  
Religion is intertwined not only with everyday activities but also with ordinary places 
and things. In Singapore, for instance, Thai Buddhist talismans are simultaneously objects of 
supernatural power and items of lucrative economic trade (Yee 1996). In places like 
Malaysia, Vietnam, Thailand, and Indonesia as well, religion is often located in the midst of 
the global marketplace. Sacred things hold blessings and merit, but are also material objects 
that can be bought and sold; indeed religion itself can be subjected to commodifying tactics 
(Kitiasa 2008). People do not just live their religion by thinking and believing or by joining 
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an official religious organization. An embodied, practical perspective on religion includes 
rituals, spaces, and emotions as well (Vasquez 2010; Brenneman 2012). 
Our study of religion in this chapter begins, then, by recognizing the pervasiveness of 
spiritual sensibilities and the fact that this spiritual realm is, for much of the world, as real 
and powerful as any political or economic force. In turn, its forms are in constant flux and 
negotiation, interacting with the political, economic, social, and cultural structures through 
which progress is pursued.  
16.1.1.2 Understanding secularity 
To understand religion properly, we also need to reflect on our understandings of 
“secularity.” Throughout the world, governments, agencies, and ordinary people may assert 
the necessity for domains where religious presence and authority are excluded. The shape of 
that territory is highly variable, defined by a given society, not by something inherent in the 
activities themselves (Burchardt and Wohlrab-Sahr 2013). Both secularity—a perceived state 
of affairs—and secularism—a desired state of affairs -- can be thought of as orientations 
emerging from Western modernity but with variations elsewhere. The secular is descriptive 
of domains of life in which there are no perceived religious dimensions. For example, 
advanced Western countries usually define economic transactions as quintessentially secular, 
but in many other cultures they have important religious significance. National constitutions 
often attempt to set legal boundaries between secular and religious domains, but such 
boundaries vary widely, both in law and in practice. And of course there can be great 
variation between individuals and between groups even within a given culture regarding what 
is treated as religious and what is secular. We expect to find variation from one context to 
another in whether it makes sense to talk about a secular world at all, and where the line 
between secular and sacred should or could be drawn, a point made well by Talal Asad 
(2003). 
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In short, neither secularity nor religion has a natural domain or function. Religion 
should rather be understood as beliefs and practices oriented to transcendent realities. 
Virtually anything humans confront, create, or do can be given religious meaning. 
Conversely, since anything can potentially be religious, there is nothing that is inherently and 
always secular. This does not mean that everything is religious (or secular), only that many 
things can be.  
It is still the case that humanity’s “limiting conditions”—death, suffering, injustice—
are likely to be explained and confronted in religious terms. Progressive efforts to reduce the 
rate of death, suffering, and injustice frequently draw on religious traditions. Religious 
practices may be aimed at this-worldly challenges, including survival in violent contexts and 
demands for basic rights (Rubin, Smilde, and Junge 2014). Equally, the most ordinary 
biographical and social achievements—family formation, birth, community celebration, and 
everyday work—are very often shaped by religious ritual. 
Discarding assumptions about an inherent religious/secular divide is especially 
important for scholars who aim to understand cultures outside “the West.” Scholars from the 
North Atlantic region are often too quick to dismiss as instrumental, insincere, or “backward” 
the religions of people whose basic necessities are not satisfied by markets or states and who 
address their problems through religious practices. Careful attention to those practices, and to 
the religious communities in which they are lived, can often yield important insights. 
Nor are the spiritual sources to which people turn just a phenomenon of the less-
developed world. A widely popular range of rituals, pilgrimages, shrines, and practices 
characterizes a milieu of “spirituality” that is present in European and North American 
societies as well (Heelas and Woodhead 2004). Some of those who participate are also active 
members of established religions, but many seek to connect with something beyond 
themselves without naming that something in theistic terms.  
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The relationship between religion and social progress must be approached, then, with 
full cognizance of both the presence and the variability of religious beliefs, communities, 
practices, and leaders. No universal boundary defines the religious and the secular, nor is 
there any clear justification for regarding some societies as religious and some not.  
16.1.2 Religion and social progress 
As set out in Chapter 2, for many humans religion is in itself a cultural good, and in 
that sense, social progress must include nurturing spaces in which individuals and 
collectivities can be free to pursue religious ends. Establishing societies in which diverse 
religious expressions can be freely pursued should be seen as a fundamental aim of social 
progress; and we will examine the evidence that such religious freedom enhances prospects 
for other social goods. The chapter will go on to argue that religious communities can be 
spaces of valued solidarity and mutual esteem, another of the fundamental goods toward 
which social progress aims. In addition, we will assess the circumstances under which 
religious communities can be partners in providing for the wellbeing of the community.  
We will also examine the ways in which religions can be impediments to basic 
principles of equal dignity, for example when they stand in the way of women or limit 
freedom of expression or block participation in democratic governing. Indeed, the same 
mechanisms that create religious solidarities can also limit toleration, restrict educational 
exploration, or lead to violent conflict. We will examine the various ways religious power 
may be allied with political projects to diminish wellbeing for denigrated populations. 
Throughout, we will assess religions in their local, embodied particularity in order to evaluate 
the possible ways they may or may not enable human flourishing.  
Religion that seems especially incompatible with social progress is often designated 
“fundamentalist.” This implicit contrast to mainstream or more established religion is 
misleading. The term is best used to refer to a type of highly salient religious identity and 
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practice that claims to be based on inerrant “fundamentals” in a religious tradition (Marty and 
Appleby 1991).6 While fundamentalist religion clearly poses a challenge to liberal modernity, 
it also provides forms of self-help or political mobilization in dire and oppressive contexts 
that mainstream religion and other secular ideologies either ignore or simply conform to.  
This points to another important way in which religion is implicated in social 
progress. We will provide evidence for the utility of religious communities as critical spaces 
in which the very parameters of progress can be discussed, debated and given moral 
grounding. As the authors of Chapter 22 tell us, social progress requires the ability to think 
about how “it could be different.” It requires that a society engage in moral deliberation and 
moral judgments. Progress is not simply a matter of finding the right technological formulas. 
Imagining what a society could become requires reaching beyond oneself, beyond the 
everyday world as it is. Progress implies a sense of meaning and purpose that has, even if 
unstated, moral valence. There are many ways such deliberations and transcendent 
imagination can be fostered, but for much of the world’s population religious communities 
and religious rituals are the spaces in which humans do the work of envisioning this-worldly  
transformation.  
This can be illustrated by thinking about social progress in African contexts (Olupona 
2012, 2014). At the center of many African cosmologies is the lifelong quest for a good life 
that is engaged in by individuals and communities. From birth to death, the blessings of 
health and long life, wealth, and children are intended to strengthen and support communal 
structures, and seeking to acquire such blessings without embedding them within the larger 
society is condemned. Spiritual belief and ritual undergird ways of pursuing peace and 
tranquility among neighbors, participation in a community of respect, fairness and 
                                                        
6 Equating “fundamentalism” with political radicalism or violent extremism is especially misleading. On the 
relationship between religion and violence, see Section 16.4 below. 
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accountability, and being in healthy harmony with the earth itself. Religion and social 
progress are mutually implicated. 
The basic framework that informs this chapter, then, is the assertion that progress and 
religious tradition are not of necessity antithetical. Even when the religious and cultural 
context sounds alien to the ears of Western-educated experts, assessing likely benefits and 
partnerships—as well as likely resistance or danger—requires critical grounded knowledge. 
Religious traditions and religious authorities can and do block needed changes that would 
increase the larger flourishing of a community. This chapter will assess both those blockages 
and the often-overlooked ways in which religious institutions, beliefs, and practices are 
partners and facilitators of the work of social progress. We begin that task by examining the 
many issues that link religion with the most intimate areas of social life, moving in 
subsequent sections to the larger arenas of political, economic, and ecological concerns. 
16.2. Family, gender, and sexuality  
As Chapter 17 on the “Pluralization of Families” points out, the vast majority of the 
world’s population lives the majority of life within family units, of varying shapes and sizes. 
And as this chapter demonstrates, a large majority of the world’s population is also religious. 
Intimate human relationships have always been shaped and surrounded by religious rules, 
rituals, and prohibitions. If anything, religions’ concern with family, gender, and sexuality 
has increased in the modern period. This shift coincides with the pluralization of family 
forms, more fluid gender identities, the drive to achieve equality between the sexes, and other 
changes documented in Chapter 17. Inevitably, this has generated internal tensions and 
debate within many religious traditions and has affected their adherents. Understanding the 
ever-changing intersections among religions, gender, sexuality, and family life is central to 
making the sort of progress envisaged in that chapter.  
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Advances in this field have however been hampered by the modernist theory 
criticized in Chapter 15, with its lingering binary between secular progress and religious 
reaction—the former considered automatically positive for the wellbeing of women, children, 
and gay people, the latter negative. Our approach takes advantage of the recent and 
burgeoning multidisciplinary research on religion and gender which considers not only male-
led, hierarchically-organized forms of “official” religion, but also everyday lived religion, in 
which women, men, and young people seek to change or reform religion, make tactical uses 
of it, or bypass its official forms altogether (Ammerman 2007; McGuire 2008; Woodhead 
2014). This enables us to offer a critical assessment of religion’s past, present, and future 
social impact.  
16.2.1 Religion and the modern family 
Historically, religion has been associated with every form of family and almost every 
imaginable form of sexual and gendered relation. The Bible, for example, variously supports 
concubinage, polygamy, monogamy, singleness and celibacy, and even discusses child 
sacrifice and murder.  
In the modern period, however, the heterosexual nuclear family came to dominate the 
religious as well as the secular imagination (see Chapter 17). Official forms of religion and 
their male leaders played an important role in shaping the ideal. In the West the Protestant 
Reformers of the sixteenth century led the way by criticizing celibacy—including all-female 
religious orders—and sacralizing the patriarchal family unit (Roper 1992). In modern 
industrial societies many religious leaders endorsed the male breadwinner model, exalting 
women’s domestic responsibilities, and affirming strong parental authority over children. By 
the late twentieth century, most male-led official religions had come to accept the 
permissibility of women’s paid work outside the home, but many continued to endorse in 
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some form a doctrine of the “complementary” but essentially different roles of men and 
women.  
The defense of the so-called “traditional” family was strongest in fundamentalism 
(originally a movement within Christianity dating from the start of the twentieth century, but 
with manifestations in most of the other world religions since then). Although it is most often 
associated with the Abrahamic religions of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, the sacralized 
nuclear family model finds religious defenders worldwide. It has also been linked with 
colonial and postcolonial nation-building projects—both secular and religious—where 
women have been relegated to the “domestic and spiritual realm” (Chatterjee 1989: 239; see 
also Sarkar 2001; Menon 2010). The family unit is presented as a God-given norm with clear 
boundaries which must be vigorously defended by the faithful. It is attributed a sacred status, 
with anything which threatens it categorized as profane—including sexual infidelity, 
“secular” state policies, egalitarian gender ideologies, feminism, and homosexuality.  
Away from official religious teachings and pronouncements, however, the lived 
realities of religious families allow for a great deal of negotiation, even circumvention of 
strictures. For example, in the face of changes that have led to the pluralization of family 
forms, ordinary Catholics often ignore the Catholic Church’s condemnation of contraception, 
homosexual relations, and remarriage after divorce (Clague 2014). There are LGBTQ 
movements in most religions, as well as liberal religious wings, which disagree with 
“official” teachings on topics such as women’s roles and same-sex marriage. Sometimes this 
pluralization of family forms within religions has gained official sanction as, for example, in 
the development of plural forms of Muslim “marriage”.7 
                                                        
7 See the “Muslim Marriages Project” directed by Annelies Moors: 
http://religionresearch.org/musmar2014/project-information/. 
17 
 
Religious clashes over different family ideals have become potent sites of political 
mobilization. They can spill over national boundaries and give rise to unexpected alliances, 
such as coalitions in defense of the traditional family which cross previously sharp religious 
and theological boundaries. In addition, the politics of sexuality and gender can become 
entangled with other political fissures. In contemporary East Africa, for example, 
homosexuality is often linked to the perceived ills and injustices of Western colonial 
societies, and to threats against religion, nationhood, and African masculinity (Ward 2002).  
There are currently many “hot” conflict points where family and gender-related ideals 
clash violently. They include abortion clinics, reproductive health legislation, legalization of 
same-sex marriage, and women’s dress. The clash is most vivid when fundamentalist forms 
of religion oppose what they see as modern forms of sexual “decadence.” The results can be 
murderous, as in forms of Islamic terrorism targeted at gay clubs and “decadent” Western 
cultural venues.  
16.2.2 Religion and gender  
Questions about family relations are intertwined with questions about the nature of 
gender, and here too religion plays a role. Women are not universally more religious than 
men, but expressions of religion often vary by gender. In each tradition and context, religious 
practice and piety figure somewhat differently in the lives of women and men, with the 
“gender gap” (with women more actively religious than men) greatest in Christianity (Pew 
Research Center 2016). 
16.2.2.1 Conservative religion 
Studies of women in conservative religious groups have challenged many 
assumptions. Researchers have discovered a variety of ways in which women both benefit 
from and sometimes subvert masculine-dominated forms of religion. In her study of a North 
American fundamentalist Christian community, Nancy Ammerman discovered that “most 
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women learn to influence family decision-making while still deferring to their husband’s 
authority” and “find ways to live with the tension between fundamentalist norms for family 
structure and modern norms of individuality and equality” (Ammerman 1987: 146). Other 
studies, like those of Elizabeth Brusco (1986) or Bernice Martin (2001) in Latin America, 
find that women can benefit by appealing to religious norms to tame machismo and 
domesticate their menfolk, turning them into better fathers and husbands. Lynn Davidman 
(1991), looking at women in Orthodox Judaism, finds that women benefit from the way in 
which the tradition sacralizes women’s roles as wives and mothers in stable family units, a 
conclusion also supported by studies of the burgeoning ultra-orthodox movement in Judaism 
(e.g. Heilman 1999).  
Recent anthropological studies on the postcolonial situation in Egypt and the Middle 
East assess women’s engagement with conservative Islam to understand how they respond to 
liberal assumptions (one could say blind-spots) on modernity, piety, femininity and agency. 
For example Saba Mahmood’s (2005) study of women in Egypt’s piety movement highlights 
how women learn to inhabit conservative norms as a way of forming the self as worthy and 
responsible. In doing so women are not only able to claim a place in previously male-only 
spaces such as the mosque, but become agents of change in their households and 
communities. Lara Deeb’s (2006) work on women in the suburbs of Beirut discusses similar 
engagements to argue that such religiosity is to be understood as a re-enchantment of 
modernity, where the “Western woman” is invoked both as foil and impetus to create an 
authentically Islamic and modern way of life in which pious selves are fashioned.8 Samia 
Huq’s (2011) study of the cultivation of piety among educated, urban Bangladeshis shows 
that while women remain attached to traditional families headed by men, they exercise 
                                                        
8 In a recent experiment involving approximately 2,500 adult subjects in Egypt, Masoud, Jamal, and Nugent 
(2016) found that individuals were more likely to favor women’s leadership when they were shown that it was 
consistent with Qur’anic teachings. 
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greater individualistic reflection, in relation both to the domestic sphere and to the cultural 
and economic conditions which have historically used sexual appeal to render women and 
wives subservient. 
The “bargains” struck with official pious and conservative modes of femininity and 
family (Kandiyoti 1988) do not, however, eliminate risks, costs, and violence for women. R. 
Marie Griffith’s (1997) study of the Charismatic-Evangelical Christian “Women’s Aglow” 
movement concludes: “If, in certain ways, prayer and testimony seem to create possibilities 
for the liberation and transformation worshippers claim to experience, they may just as 
readily work to opposite ends, further institutionalizing the roles and boundaries that constrict 
women’s space” (1997: 210). Although it provided a safe space in which some women could 
speak to one another about violence and abuse within the pious household, the remedy was 
limited. 
Gender-based violence does not seem to be especially linked to particular religions or 
strands within them. No large-scale systematic study exists, but work on domestic violence in 
Christian groups in North America (e.g. Sevcik, Rothery, Nason-Clark, and Pynn 2015) 
suggests that rates are not significantly higher than outside such contexts.9 Studies of clerical 
abuse in Ireland (e.g. Keenan 2012) reveal an interlocking system of inequalities in which 
religion is just one factor. The extreme example of religiously-legitimated male domination 
and violence against women in fundamentalist groups like ISIS and Boko Haram is now 
beginning to be studied (e.g. Stern and Berger 2016), but larger patterns and processes are not 
yet well understood.  
Thus, even when they can be subverted and used tactically, and though secular 
solutions may be worse than what they replace, conservative religious legitimations of 
                                                        
9 This study helpfully points out that responses to domestic violence are best when they draw on the particular 
religious or secular beliefs of the community. 
20 
 
difference and inequality between men, women, and children often stand as blocks in the way 
of progress.  
16.2.2.2 Liberal and reform movements  
Internal religious critiques of sexism date back at least to the nineteenth century. 
Worldwide, effective calls for equal human dignity have sometimes taken religious as well as 
secular forms. Fresh energy was poured into religious movements for progressive change 
from the 1970s onward. In the wake of the Iranian revolution of 1979, for example, an 
epistemological and theoretical shift took place in Islamic thought which involved the 
historical contextualization of Islam and women’s roles and responsibilities in Muslim 
societies (e.g. Mernissi 1991; Ahmed 1992). This fed into an ongoing attempt to dissociate 
Islam from structural inequalities and cultural practices sanctioning discrimination against 
women (Barlas 2002; Moghadem 2005; Najmabadi 2005). 
In Christianity a great deal of effort was injected into campaigns for women’s 
ordination as priests, which proved successful in most Protestant denominations between the 
1920s and 1990s, but not in the Roman Catholic or Orthodox Churches (Chaves 1997). These 
campaigns were accompanied by the development of “feminist theology,” in which Christian 
doctrines, ethics, and liturgy were read and reinterpreted through an explicitly feminist lens 
(Parsons 2010). In Buddhism, there were successful efforts to revive orders of Buddhist nuns 
(Mohr and Tsedroen 2009; Kawanami 2013). Female religious orders remain important in 
several religions, including Roman Catholic Christianity, where they focus women’s 
collective energy and often work actively for greater equality—sometimes against the wishes 
of male authority.  
In Islam, recent reform movements include Musawah, initiated in Kuala Lumpur and 
currently headquartered in Rabat. Musawah aims to reform Muslim family law, working with 
legal experts, Islamic clergy and scholars, and anthropologists and historians. By highlighting 
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the diversity of legitimate Islamic juristic opinion and by engaging in research on the ground, 
it seeks to shift the construction of marriage and gender relations from one in which women 
are obedient and subjugated to one more compatible with scriptural injunctions to show love, 
mercy, and equal respect for both genders (Anwar 2009; Mir-Hosseini, Al-Sharmani, and 
Rumminger 2015). Musawah continues to advocate reform in family laws in many parts of 
the world and has had some notable successes, for example in legal reform in Morocco.  
Such initiatives are not without critique from other Muslims, however. Lila Abu 
Lughod (2015) argues that movements such as Musawah and the Global Muslim Women’s 
Shura Council resort to a human rights model that separates Muslim women from their own 
cultures and obscures the structural, political, and economic factors—played out at a global 
level and in the everyday—that contribute to women’s suffering. And Saba Mahmood (2006) 
points out that an imperialist logic is at play when Islamic cultural practices such as veiling or 
“honor killings” are declared in need of remedy, thereby justifying Western military and 
other kinds of intervention in Muslim societies. Outside agents seeking progressive change 
would do well to listen carefully to the everyday narratives of women’s lives, mindful that 
faith-based organizations themselves are often sites where progressive change begins. 
Internal movements for religious reform have generally focused on women and 
femininities, and less attention has been paid to men, masculinities, and gender relations in a 
broader sense. Where there has been explicit attention to masculinity, it has often been in 
order to defend a patriarchal family model. In the wake of feminism, such defense in 
conservative Christian circles is often couched in terms of the support of strong but 
“responsible” forms of male headship. Van Klinken’s (2013) study of African Christian 
masculinities in the context of AIDS reveals a strongly heterosexual, masculinist Protestant 
Christian mode of male headship, and a gentler Catholic one which is “queered” by devotion 
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to Mary and the general use of more feminine imaginary. Gender never means just women, 
and religious effects on the gender order cover a wide spectrum.  
16.2.3 Sexuality  
Religious leaders and teachings have often been prescriptive about both sex and 
sexual identity. Many religions continue to frown upon sex outside of marriage, but most 
have abandoned the enforcement of sexual prescriptions within marriage. That said, the 
Roman Catholic Church’s insistence on “natural” rather than artificial forms of birth control 
remains an important exception. 
Growing diversity and fluidity in relation to gender and sexual identity and practice 
has called forth a more vocal response. Opposition to homosexuality is by no means confined 
to religion, but it is a feature of all fundamentalisms and a great deal of mainstream religious 
opinion as well. But there are also dissenting voices, who reread traditional religious sources 
to problematize “homophobic” readings. For example, the story of the Prophet Lut/Lot and 
the City of Sodom which is present in the Qur’an as well as the Bible can and has been read 
not as a condemnation of “sodomy,” but as a story of oppressive power, miserliness, 
inhospitality, and arrogance where male sex acts are vilified for the abuse of power they 
represent in that particular context. In his study of Homosexuality in Islam, Kugle (2003) 
begins with the Qur’an’s injunction that humanity should respect and celebrate diversity, 
going on to show how later commentaries highlighted the existence of hermaphrodites (a 
third gender). The Sunna (sayings and examples of the Prophet Muhammad) also mention 
men who are akin to women and men who are not attracted to women, without elaborating on 
the reason for their lack of desire. Resources, such as these, from within religious traditions, 
can provide a bridge between religious populations and secular reformers.  
There are bridges in everyday practice, as well. LGBTQ movements are now found 
within all religious traditions, sometimes pressing for reform of official religion, and 
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sometimes setting up alternative religious communities and networks. A recent study of the 
religious and sexual identities of young people across many religious traditions (Yip and 
Page 2013) found that those in conservative religious groups generally found their faith a 
support in helping them defend their identity in wider society, claiming, “If God made me 
like this, this is who I am meant to be.” 
Such movements and the issues they represent are often major conflict points within 
religions, as well as in secular societies. The global Anglican communion of churches, for 
example, has become internally riven over the legitimacy of homosexual practice and same-
sex marriage (Hassett 2007). In Islam, organizations like the UK-based Imaan and the Safra 
Project for women, along with the U.S.-origin Al-Fatiha Foundation, are similarly 
controversial. The latter, founded in 1998, offers a platform for believing and practicing 
LGBTQ Muslims transnationally, with several chapters in the United States and offices in 
Canada, the UK, Spain, and South Africa. However, an international Islamic group called Al-
Mouhajiroun, which seeks an Islamic Caliphate, declared in 2001 that members of Al-Fatiha 
were apostates. In spite of these pressures, a handful of mosques in the United States and 
South Africa have openly gay imams. They remain marginal, however, and are strongly 
opposed by many well-respected contemporary voices of Islamic authority.10 
16.2.4 Alternative religions and spiritualities 
Alternative religious movements can serve as incubators for social change, and over 
the course of history there have been religious communities which have experimented with 
various forms of sexual, gender, and family relations—including promiscuity, polygamy, 
polygyny, communal childrearing, and of course, various forms of celibacy.  
                                                        
10 See for example Jama (2015) and Henking (2012). 
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Religions run chiefly by women—and often for women—have been rare (Sered 
1994), but their relative weight and importance in the religious landscape has increased in 
modern times. Some are self-consciously new, but most involve at least a partial revival of 
indigenous traditions. Today they include goddess movements, Wicca, various forms of 
ecologically-oriented “holistic” spirituality, and movements focused on healing of the earth 
and of “body, mind and spirit” (e.g. Reiki, Yoga, religious forms of mindfulness, neo-
paganism and other revived forms of indigenous religion and “nature religion”). Some are 
focused on individual wellbeing; others combine this with political and ecological activism.  
This second wave, starting with Wicca in the 1940s, expanded on nineteenth-century 
movements such as Theosophy and Christian Science which were founded and dominated by 
women. More recent charismatic figures like Starhawk (1979), the feminist activist and 
witch, offered new rituals and practices which women and men could adapt to their own 
lives, relationships, and socio-sexual situations. A study of alternative spiritualities in Britain 
in the early twenty-first century found that 80 percent of their leaders and participants were 
women (Heelas and Woodhead 2004).  
From being counter-cultural in the first half of the twentieth century, the “alternative” 
spiritual milieu has expanded its influence to become increasingly mainstream in many 
countries. Its spread has been assisted by its easy relations with new media, old and new 
healing and wellbeing practices, and the opportunities opened by entrepreneurial consumer 
capitalism (Lofton 2010). “Spirituality” is now found in everyday education, healthcare, and 
popular culture throughout Europe and North America and more widely. It involves a quiet 
but effective shift away from male religious authorities and official forms of religion to 
authority located in the conscience of each individual, in connections with one another, and in 
tapping the “energy” of the cosmos. Typically, but not necessarily, such spirituality takes an 
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appreciative and affirming view of equal gender relations and is relaxed about the 
pluralization of family forms and intimate relations.  
16.2.5 Conclusion 
Study of the lived realities of religion reveals that in spite of official teachings of 
many male-dominated “world religions”, religious communities and people very often arrive 
at pragmatic compromises surrounding family, sexuality, and gender relations. Broadly 
speaking the main religious stances and orientations may be summarized as “Consolidating” 
(legitimating existing inequality), “Tactical” (working within existing constraints to subvert 
them), “Questing” (seeking alternatives for personal benefit rather than structural change), 
and “Counter-cultural” (working for progressive structural change) (Woodhead 2007). 
Assessing a local group’s particular religious orientation(s) to gender, family, and sexuality is 
essential to any effort at social reform, and essential to finding points where values converge 
and where religious organizations have needed capacities. That means recognizing that the 
most important differences run not just between but within different religious traditions 
(including all the “world religions”), and even within a family unit itself. 
16.3. Religion, diversity, and democracy 
In this section and the one to follow, we address the complex connections between 
religion, politics, and social progress. We begin with a focus on religious diversity, looking 
first at the reasons for this and then at the shifts in religious realities across the globe. 
Following this, we turn to the ways in which diversity is managed in different parts of the 
world, paying particular attention to “multiculturalism” and “secularism,” recognizing that 
both are various. That discussion leads in turn to the relationship between religion(s) and 
democracy itself—an issue already touched on in Chapter 14. Then in Section 16.4, we 
elaborate on questions of human rights, violent conflicts, and peace-making.  
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In the course of this section, the reader’s attention is drawn to Sidebars in which 
concrete situations are developed in more detail to illustrate particular points.  
16.3.1 Diversity, mobility and migration 
The mobility and migration of people constitutes a major theme running through the 
work of the IPSP—unsurprisingly in that the presence of migrants and the tensions 
surrounding them have become critical flashpoints at the beginning of the twenty-first 
century, challenging societies to develop effective modes of political and social governance. 
Religion must be considered a significant factor in this process. Just as migration can be 
propelled by a faltering economy or civil unrest, it can be spurred by political and cultural 
persecution of a religious group. And just as migration can remake families and cultures, it 
also remakes religious traditions and political processes.  
A distinguished body of research now exists on the multifaceted relationship between 
religion and migration (Warner and Wittner 1998; Beckford 2016). One theme stands out: the 
effects constitute a two-way flow, often mediated by the communication technologies that 
link communities across territory. Religions inspire, manage, and benefit from the migration 
process, but at the same time beliefs, identities, and practices are reshaped by the associated 
dislocating of populations. Take, for example, the evolution of religions that are 
“traditionally” linked to particular global regions or national contexts. What happens when 
members of a religious majority learn to live as a minority in a new place, in which culture 
and religion are no longer interrelated? It is important to look in detail at the ways in which 
organizational forms and leadership styles adapt. Equally significant are the currents that feed 
back into the country of origin and their effects on the home community.11  
                                                        
11 An extensive body of material examines these mutual influences. Stoeckl (2014) explores Orthodox 
communities; Sinha (forthcoming) introduces a wide literature on diaspora Hinduism. Warner and Wittner 
(1998) and Yang and Ebaugh (2001a; 2001b) offer valuable insights regarding new immigrant communities in 
the United States. 
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The role of religion in the reception of migrants is the subject of Part V of Beckford’s 
(2016) first volume, and a particularly instructive example can be found in Margarita 
Mooney’s (2013) study of Haitian immigrants in three very different places: Miami, 
Montreal, and Paris. Mooney notes that the differentiation between religion and the state in 
the United States (a structural variable) allows faith-based organizations to assist and 
advocate for Haitians in Miami. In contrast, both Quebec (characterized by secular 
nationalism) and France (dominated by a more assertive secularism), discourage community 
organizations based on religious or ethnic identifications. The greater scope for action 
allowed to the primarily religious mediating organizations established by the Haitian 
community in Miami more effectively assisted the reception of newcomers. Thus macro, 
meso, and micro levels are brought together in the understanding of religion as a crucial 
variable in the successful resettlement of migrants. 
A further point is important: diversity does not always depend on physical contact 
between people. Religious differences can exist “virtually” as well as on the ground. Modern 
means of communication make us aware of previously unfamiliar religious practices and 
populations. Where citizens have little personal knowledge or experience of religions, media 
representations—dominated by what commands immediate attention—shape attitudes (Knott 
and Poole 2013). The growing use of media technologies in the portrayal of and the 
communication between religions is a vital element in the management of religious 
differences. It also plays a role in the constant reconfigurations of the religious field per se. 
16.3.2 The many faces of religious diversity 
The presence of religious diversity is far from uniform (Grim 2015). In most parts of 
the world diversity is growing, in others declining, and in still others it remains relatively 
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stable. The following examples illustrate these patterns articulating the wide variety of 
reasons for both growth and decline during the period 1970-2015.12  
At one end of the spectrum are those societies that were relatively stable for a long 
period of time, but which are now becoming more religiously diverse. Western Europe is an 
obvious and high profile example. Here there has been economically motivated in-migration 
since the mid-twentieth century, bringing not only substantial numbers of Christians from the 
global South but a growing Muslim presence (Roy 2007). The political consequences are 
considerable, but are experienced differently in different nation states (See Sidebar 16.1).13 
 
Figure 16.2. Religious diversity in Southern, Western and Northern Europe, 1970 and 
2015 
 
Coterminous with this transformation, though much less noticed until the late 
twentieth century, has been the diversification of Latin American Christianity. Here a solidly 
                                                        
12 These draw on the material brought together in Johnson, Grim, and Zurlo (2016). Additional religious 
demographic data can be gleaned from the Association of Religion Data Archives (ARDA), Pennsylvania State 
University (www.thearda.com/); Economic and Social Data Service (ESDS) (www.esds.ac.uk/); Integrated 
Public Use Microdata Series International (IPUMS), Minnesota Population Center, University of Minnesota 
(https://international.ipums.org/international/); and ZACAT Data Archive for the Social Sciences (GESIS), 
Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences (http://zacat.gesis.org/).  
13 For a comparison of European approaches to the United States, see Casanova (2007). 
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Catholic global region is now experiencing the rapid growth of Protestantism, mostly in its 
Pentecostal forms (see Figure 16.3). Once again there is variation from country to country, 
but the changing nature of the continent overall—including the effects on Catholicism 
itself—reflects a wider global shift.14 
Figure 16.3 The growth of Pentecostalism in Latin America, 1970 and 2015 
 
Aspects of these changes can be seen in a second set of examples: those parts of the 
world which were sites of aggressive and politically motivated secularization for most of the 
twentieth century but which are now experiencing religious restoration and growth. Since 
1989, formerly hegemonic Orthodox churches have reasserted themselves strongly in Russia 
and Eastern Europe, but at the expense very often of minority religions (See Figure 16.4). In 
China, the process is more complex. Not only does the Communist Party in China remain 
resolutely atheist, but its attitudes toward religions deemed “foreign” are different from its 
dealings with Confucianism, Daoism or Buddhism (Yang 2012) (See Sidebar 16.2). That 
                                                        
14 See Section 16.3.4 below, as well as Sidebar 16.6. 
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said, China is a part of the world where Christianity is growing noticeably not least in its 
Pentecostal forms (See Figure 16.5). 
Figure 16.4. Religious diversity in Russia and Eastern Europe, 1970 and 2015 
 
Figure 16.5. The growth of religion in China, 1970 and 201515 
 
 
                                                        
15 It is notoriously difficult to estimate the number of Christians in China and figures range widely. Although 
there are multiple disputes surrounding the Chinese numbers, we rely on the World Religion Database (Johnson, 
Grim, and Zurlo 2016). The WRD takes into consideration both registered and unregistered Christian affiliation. 
Further, the WRD places Christianity in China in the context of other religions, thereby serving as the most 
uniformly reliable source. 
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A third set of cases is located in parts of the world where religious diversity most 
certainly exists but is nothing new. In Southeast Asia, for example, there has been little 
overall change over this period (see Figure 16.6). That said, what might be called 
“constitutive” diversity continues to evolve as migration—at times propelled by repression—
moves religious traditions along with people. It is equally clear that colonialism altered the 
religious ecology in this part of the world (and elsewhere) in ways that can still be seen (see 
Sidebar 16.3).  
 
Figure 3.5 Religious diversity in Southeast Asia, 1970 and 2015 
 
The United States is very different, but it too is a society built on diversity, as wave 
after wave of migrants found their way there—initially across the Atlantic and more recently 
from very different parts of the world (see Figure 16.7). Diversity is part of American self-
understanding: individually, collectively, and constitutionally (see Sidebar 16.4). In recent 
years, the challenges have included the accommodation of faiths other than Christian, 
especially Islam—a problematic step for some Americans. 
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Figure 16.7 The changing diversity of the United States, 1970 and 2015 
 
 
The final group of cases reminds us that increasing diversity is not uniformly the case; 
the reverse process also occurs, but once again for widely differing reasons. In large swathes 
of Africa, for instance, there is decreasing diversity due to a “modernizing” process that 
encourages adherence to “world” religions rather than to a plethora of local traditional faiths 
(see Figure 16.8). That said, careful attention should be paid to the details of each country—
they are far from uniform.  
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Figure 16.8. Religious diversity in East Africa, 1970 and 2015 
 
Figure 16.9. Religious diversity in the Middle East, 1970 and 2015 
 
The Middle East, conversely, is characterized by decreasing diversity because of 
conflict and dispersion. The displacement of historic religious communities, long at home in 
the region, is a recent and tragic phenomenon (see Figure 16.9).16 
What emerges from all these examples is the constantly generative nature of religious 
diversity in the twenty-first century. As political, social, economic and natural forces push 
                                                        
16 There is a developed discussion on recent developments in the Middle East in Chapter 20. 
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populations from one place to another, some parts of the world will become more religiously 
diverse, while others will become more homogeneous. Equally important in any given society 
are the shifts produced by changes internal to the population. Individuals in new contexts 
have new religious options, keeping in mind that changing or leaving one’s religion is a 
possibility understood differently in different parts of the world and can by no means be 
taken for granted (Martin 2013: 185).  
In short, religion is a crucially important factor in understanding diversity but it never 
stands alone. It is part of a bigger picture which must be approached contextually. That said, 
religious diversity is distinctive, for which reason it is inadvisable to think of religious 
identities simply as one among other cultural preferences. Differences in religious belief and 
practice are likely to strike more foundational chords than differences in taste or style. 
Diversities, moreover, can be found within as well as between faiths. Indeed “liberals” from 
various faiths may well have more in common with each other than they do with their 
respective, rather more “conservative” co-religionists.  
James Beckford (2003) underlines an additional point: religious diversity (a state of 
affairs) is to be distinguished from religious pluralism (a normative term implying the 
acceptance or otherwise of diversity). The descriptive and the normative are all too often 
confused in the literature. Beckford also separates out societal, organizational, and individual 
levels of understanding, reflecting the fact that religious diversity presents differently in 
different domains: state, politics, civil society, culture, interpersonal relations, and so on.17 It 
follows that individuals may welcome diversity within societies or polities that do not, and 
                                                        
17 For additional discussions of the politics of religious diversity, see Demerath (2001), Wuthnow (2004), 
Banchoff (2008), and Finucane and Feener (2014). 
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vice versa. Some groups may, in fact, advocate for societal toleration so as to protect their 
own exclusivist beliefs (Yang 2014). 
Sidebar 16.1 
 
Post-War Changes in Europe 
Grace Davie 
 
 
       For the purposes of this case study, the European “story” of religious diversity begins 
in the post-war period,1 when Britain, France, the Netherlands and (then) West Germany 
looked for sources of labor to support their expanding economies. The UK turned to India 
and the West Indies and France to the Mahgreb (both influenced by former colonization). 
The Netherlands looked to Turkey and Morocco, and Germany to Turkey and the (then) 
Yugoslavia). As a result there was growing religious diversity in all four countries – 
including Muslims, Hindus, Sikhs, and many varieties of Christians -- but differently 
constituted in each case depending on the provenance of the migrant community. This 
phase came to an end in the 1970s as the global economy faltered.  
       Some two decades later in-migration into Europe once again gathered speed, but 
this time the receiving societies included both the Nordic and the Mediterranean countries 
as well.  The rapidity of the change in the Mediterranean countries is worth noting; almost 
overnight countries of emigration in the earlier period began to receive significant 
numbers of new arrivals. The enlargements of the European Union in 2004 and 2007 
stimulated a rather different movement, this time from East to West Europe, bearing in 
mind that inflows from whatever direction were significantly curtailed follow ing the 
financial crash in 2008. A final phase can be seen in the current (2015 on) “migrant crisis” 
largely brought about by the conflict in the Middle East. The consequences of this influx 
are still unfolding. 
       Very little of this movement of people can be considered religiously motivated, with 
the possible exception of Christians fleeing war or persecution in the Middle East.3  For 
the huge majority of incomers the primary reason for moving has been economic. The 
consequences for religion are, however, immense as an increasingly secular Europe is 
obliged to come to terms with the re-emergence of religion in public life. The trigger has 
been the arrival of other significant faith communities, among which Muslims are by far 
the largest.  
       Despite the negativity of media accounts it is important to acknowledge the 
capacities of (West) European societies to absorb considerable numbers of Muslims, 
enabling them to establish effective communities in different parts of the continent 
(Joppke and Morawska 2014; Joppke and Torpey 2013). The election in 2016 of a 
practicing Muslim as mayor of London (the largest city in Europe) is a potent symbol of 
this “success.”  
       That said, a series of incidents across Europe testify to continuing difficulties. These 
include the Rushdie controversy in Britain (1989 on), the affaire du foulard in France 
(1989 on); the murders of Pim Fortuyn (2002) and Theo van Gogh (2004) in the 
Netherlands; the furor over the cartoons of Mohammed published by a Danish newspaper 
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(2005), a debate that subsequently spread to Sweden (2007); the challenge to the legality 
of minarets in a Swiss referendum (2009); the banning of the burqa or niqab in public in 
some parts of Europe (2014); and religiously-motivated violence in Paris (2015), Belgium 
(2016) and the UK (2017). Each of these incidents raises issues particular to the country in 
question. The underlying concerns are, however, common: they reflect the willingness (or 
not) of European societies to accommodate a minority whose religious assumptions 
challenge the status quo, and the capacities of that minority to live in diaspora.  
      It is important to recall the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in the management of this agenda. Article 9 of 
the ECHR has two clauses. Article 9(1) ensures an absolute right to hold a religion or belief 
and a qualified right to manifest this in worship, teaching, practice, and observance. Article 
9(2) states that the freedom to manifest a religion or belief is subject to “necessary” 
limitations.4 This distinction is key. Equally important is the jurisprudence emanating from 
the ECtHR in religion-related cases, which are growing in number. Growing religious 
diversity is a matter of on-going negotiation on the part of national and international legal 
systems. Foblets, Alidadi, Nielsen, and Yanasmayan (2014) bring together much of the 
literature on belief, law, and politics in Europe. 
       A final point is, however, crucial. Political arrangements and legal decision-making are 
central to the effective management of religious diversity, but the capacities of diverse 
populations to live alongside each other are equally – perhaps more – important. Why is it, 
for example, that France is (without doubt) both constitutionally and institutionally more 
democratic than Britain, but Britain is – or has been until recently – more tolerant than 
France? 
      This includes religious tolerance – unsurprisingly in that sizeable religious minorities 
have existed in Britain for centuries rather than decades. It is also a function of a 
constitutional rather than majoritarian democracy. Paradoxically it is frequently the non-
elected (i.e. less democratic) elements of the British political system – the monarchy, the 
unelected second chamber and the established church – that consistently defend the rights 
of religious minorities. An almost irresistible question follows from this: that is to ask which 
way of working – of managing pluralism – is “better”?  Is it the French or the British? It is, 
however an invidious question. A more constructive approach endeavours to understand 
the legacies of history (both good and less good) in each European society and to work 
creatively within these. As we argue throughout this chapter, this is not a case of one size 
fits all. 
          
1 This account draws largely on Davie (2006, 2013) both of which contain extensive references on 
religious diversity in post-war Europe. 
2 There was in addition politically motivated migration into The Netherlands from the Dutch 
East Indies (now Indonesia) and Surinam (both former colonies).   
3 The arrival of significant numbers of Jews in the 19th and early 20th century was differently motivated 
as Jewish communities fled the pogroms in Russia and East Europe. Sadly antisemitism is currently 
re-emerging as a distressing feature of European societies. 
4 Article 9/2 reads as follows: “Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to 
such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of 
public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others.” 
5 This volume contains the report of the RELIGARE project and 28 responses to this. RELIGARE was 
a European Commission 7th Framework Project on religious diversity and secular models in Europe 
which focused on innovative approaches to law and democracy. See www.religareproject.eu/. See 
also the continuing publications of Eva Brems at the Human Rights Centre, Ghent University – 
www.hrc.ugent.be/staff/eva-brems/, Matthias Koenig at the Max Plank Institute, Göttingen – 
www.mmg.mpg.de/en/departments/max-planck-fellows/prof-matthias-koenig/ and the extensive 
bibliography compiled as part of the “Directions in Religion Pluralism in Europe” project - 
http://grassrootsmobilise.eu/bibliography. 
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Sidebar 16.2 
 
Accommodating New Forms of Religion: Chinese 
Dilemmas 
Fenggang Yang 
 
       The Chinese case is a distinctive example of the interplay between religious diversity 
and state regulation. Clearly, the historical legacies of both the Chinese dynasties and 
Communist rule have shaped religion in China (Yang 2012). Since the late 19th century, 
Chinese elites have attempted to modernize China, often involving efforts to suppress 
some or all religions. Soon after the overthrow of the Manchu Dynasty and the 
establishment of the Republic (1912), and partly in response to the attempt to reestablish 
a monarchy in 1915, the cultural elites – influenced first by the French Enlightenment and 
subsequently by the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 – campaigned to reject religion in favor 
of science and democracy. They accused traditional religions (i.e. Confucianism, 
Buddhism, and Daoism) of holding back the modernization process, and saw Christianity 
as a tool of Western imperialism. Following the Communist revolution in 1949, the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) in mainland China attempted to eradicate all religions, 
especially in the course of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976).  
       Since 1979, China has permitted five religions to operate legally – Buddhism, 
Catholicism, Christianity (Protestantism), Daoism, and Islam – seeing these as 
conventional religions with relatively large numbers of believers in China. The Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) has, however, retained atheism as its formal ideology, which is 
required for CCP and Chinese Communist Youth League members, is propagated through 
the mass media, and permeates the education system from elementary school to graduate 
level. Thus the current tolerance toward the five religions is maintained for pragmatic 
reasons only. The CCP still insists that religion will eventually die out and that religious 
organizations and activities must be politically controlled.  
       That said, the PRC seeks acceptance as a modern nation that follows the principles 
of the United Nations in its Charter and related covenants. For this reason, the PRC 
Constitution includes a clause that states that individual “freedom of religious belief” is 
protected.  The Constitution, however, is subordinate to the CCP leadership, ideology and 
policies and cannot be cited directly in court adjudication. Thus, religious freedom has a 
lower priority than the political agenda and the need for social stability. Nevertheless, the 
UN norm, along with the presence of more open-minded cultural and political elites, 
makes possible a limited social space for religion in Chinese society. 
      I will expand these points in terms of the “red,” “black,” and “gray” markets of religion 
that co-exist in China (Yang 2012). Apart from the radical years of 1966 to 1979 (when all 
religious activities were prohibited), the PRC under the CCP has allowed the above-
mentioned five major religions to function. The CCP, however, has also imposed strict 
restrictions on religious organizations and activities. For example to operate legally, 
religious groups have to join the “patriotic” associations designated for their respective 
religions. These associations mediate between the CCP and religious groups, allowing the 
CCP to maintain control over the selection of clergy and lay leaders, over permits for 
building and renovation, over religious gatherings and religious literature. Conversely, 
through the same mechanisms, religious groups may make their requests known to the 
party-state. Thus, in economic terms, there is a supply side (religious organizations under 
the “patriotic” associations), a demand side (religious believers and groups), and a 
regulator (the party-state). Together these components comprise what I have called the 
“red market” of religion in China.  
       There are, however, many individuals and groups within the five religions who 
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perceive the “patriotic” associations as detrimental to the authenticity of their belief, 
practice, and organization, and – consequently – have refused to join. Instead they have 
operated illegally in the “black market” of religion in China. Since the 1980s, the party-state 
has designated about 20 religious groups as counterrevolutionary groups or evil cults (xie 
jiao), inflicting severe penalties on them (confiscating properties, dispersing gatherings, 
imposing fines, imprisoning the most active leaders, and in some cases sentencing  key 
leaders to death or life imprisonment). Nonetheless, most of these groups remain 
operative in China, some with large numbers of followers.  
       In addition to the “red market” and “black market,” there is a “gray market” of religion in 
China. In this “market” the individuals, groups, and activities concerned are neither legal 
nor illegal. Alternatively, they are both legal and illegal but for different reasons. The “gray 
market” includes many folk religious practices that follow community or clan traditions, 
together with individual spiritual beliefs and practices that lie outside the five religions. It 
also includes government-backed tourist or cultural sites that provide religious services to 
visitors, and a selection of beliefs and practices that are markedly ambiguous in terms of 
their religious nature, such as venerating ancestors, Confucius, or the CCP leader Mao 
Zedong.  Finally, a number of clergy in the approved “patriotic” associations may engage in 
activities that would be considered illegal. For example, bishops and priests under the 
Catholic Patriotic Association are supposed to be independent of the Pope. However, most 
of the bishops have discreetly sought and received recognition from Rome. Similarly, some 
Protestant ministers in the officially approved Three-Self Patriotic Movement Committee 
have preached in “house church” congregations that may be considered illegal by the 
party-state. Thus the “gray market” in China is highly varied; it is also widespread in both 
urban and rural areas.  
       In short, a range of religions are thriving in China. Hundreds of millions of people 
believe and practice Buddhism, Daoism, and folk religion. Tens of millions of ethnic 
minorities adhere to Islam. The rapid increase of Christian conversions in the 21st century 
is especially striking. The relative strength of religions, especially Christianity, is puzzling to 
political and cultural elites. So much so that in recent years, the Chinese authorities, 
unwilling to adopt Western models of religious freedom, have brought back earlier forms of 
control, which favor traditional Chinese religions while suppressing others, especially the 
so-called “foreign” religions of Christianity and Islam.  
       A recent example of political suppression can be found in the campaign to remove 
crosses from the roofs of Christian churches. Between 2014 and 2016, the province of 
Zhejiang in eastern China carried out a campaign of renovation of old factories and 
villages, which have been absorbed into newly developed urban areas. As part of this 
“landscape beautification” campaign, more than 1,500 crosses were forcefully removed 
from church buildings. Indeed a few churches, such as the Sanjiang Church in a suburb of 
Wenzhou City – whose members resisted the order to take down the rooftop cross – were 
demolished. Furthermore church leaders who openly challenged the campaign were 
removed from office, detained for extended periods, and in some cases formally 
prosecuted and sentenced to prison. Interestingly, the cross-removal campaign targeted 
Christian churches in the legal “red market.” As a response, some Christian pastors left the 
“patriotic” associations and went to the “gray market.” It is important to note, however, that 
most Christians in Zhejiang have been able to continue their routine services and religious 
gatherings, albeit under closer surveillance by the party-state.  
     In understanding these shifts, I have argued that social scientific theories developed in 
Western contexts cannot simply be transposed to China (or indeed anywhere else). 
Conceptual adjustments are necessary if we are to grasp what is happening. In this case 
the concepts of religious demand, supply, and regulation are manifest in a distinctive 
dynamic in the three types of responses to religious regulation – red, black and gray. As I 
concluded in my extended discussion of the Chinese case, “Under heavy regulation, the 
gray market is likely to be volatile and unsettled, making religious regulation an arduous  
 
39 
 
 
 
task and impossible to enforce by the government superstructure” (Yang 2012: 177). 
       In contrast to mainland China, the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan began in 1987 
to implement the constitutional separation of religion and the state and the protection of 
religious freedom, a principle that had been inscribed in the Republic of China Constitution 
that took effect in all of China in 1947. However, in 1949 the ROC government under 
Guomindang (Nationalist Party) lost the civil war with the Communists, withdrew from the 
mainland to Taiwan, and suspended the Constitution under martial law. Only in 1987 was 
martial law finally lifted, permitting the ROC Constitution to be fully implemented in Taiwan. 
This included freedom of religion, freedom of the press, freedom to form political parties, 
and open elections for the presidency and for members of the parliament. Today, religious 
freedom and religious pluralism have become accepted cultural norms in Taiwan, where 
diverse religions coexist and compete peacefully in an open market (Clart and Jones 2003; 
Kuo 2013; Laliberté 2009). Starting from very similar religious cultures, the mainland and 
Taiwan have arrived at very different places. The contrast indicates that social, legal, and 
political arrangements are more important than culture, whether traditional or modern, in 
constructing a society with harmonious relations between a variety of religions and 
secularisms. 
 
Sidebar 16.3 
 
“Religious Education” in a Southeast Asian Context: 
Insights from Singapore 
Vineeta Sinha 
 
 
      Like other multi-religious societies Singapore has had to learn how to “manage” its 
potential tensions (Lai 2008).1  Eugene Tan’s pertinent observation about ethnicity applies 
equally to religion: “Ethnicity is a Janus-faced creature in Singapore, simultaneously 
portrayed as a threat and a source of cultural ballast” (Tan 2004: 88). Religion is valued as 
a resource even as it is viewed as a hazard. The state has accepted that Singapore 
society must be religiously plural, but is wary of the possibility of potential religious conflict 
inherent in this diversity. The Singapore state’s adoption of secularism is a partial answer, 
yet its pragmatic orientation sees it heavily involved in charting a religiously peaceful 
scene. 
       The question of formal religious instruction in Singapore schools was raised as early 
as 1955. The “1955 Ethics and Religious Committee” advised the teaching of ethics or 
religious knowledge for all students within school hours and premises, making provisions 
for students to study their own religion (Doraisamy 1969). However this exercise was 
abandoned as it raised questions about the involvement of a secular state in matters of 
religious instruction. In 1957 an Education ordinance was passed allowing religious 
schools to provide religious instruction, but this too was abandoned in government schools 
even as the teaching of ethics continued to be part of the curriculum. 
      Upon self-government in 1959, full independence in 1963, and ejection from Malaysia 
leading to nationhood in 1965, the political leadership of Singapore assumed responsibility 
for a multi-ethnic and multi-religious polity. From the outset, the centrality of religion in the 
lives of citizens was recognized, even though religion was perceived to be a sensitive 
matter. Members of a multi-religious and multi-ethnic society were assured of their right to 
profess a religion (or not) and the freedom to practice it. At this point Singapore defined 
itself as a secular state without excluding religion, which was seen as crucial moral and 
cultural ballast. 
       In 1974, the need for religious education in schools was given expression at the  
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national level. The undertaking of religious education by a secular government was 
deemed to be a “complex question,” and was shelved until the late 1970s and 1980s when 
the Ministry of Education appointed appropriately skilled committees to explore the 
feasibility of introducing “moral education” in schools. These efforts resulted in the 
implementation of two such programs in all primary schools. In 1982 the two schemes 
introduced, “Good Citizen” and “Being and Becoming,” were pronounced successful, while 
a report released in the same year argued for a follow up program for secondary schools.  
       In 1984 “Religious Knowledge” (RK), a compulsory subject, was introduced amidst 
awareness of the “danger areas” – flagged by parents and educators alike – of this 
initiative. Nonetheless RK was taught to all secondary school students, replacing the 
existing subject: “Civics and Current Affairs.” When the idea was first mooted, four options 
were offered in RK: Bible Knowledge, Buddhist Studies (to be taught in English and 
Mandarin), Islamic Knowledge (to be taught only in Malay) and Hindu Studies (to be taught 
only in English). It was also decided that ethnic Malay students should only study Islamic 
Knowledge given the “sensitivity of the issue” (The Straits Times, 17 January 1982). The 
same rationale did not apply to students of other ethnic groups who in theory were free to 
opt for any of the four choices. A fifth and sixth option were added, “World Religions,” and 
“Confucian Ethics”. In 1983, “Sikh Studies” became the seventh option, following an 
appeal by members of the Sikh Advisory Board. RK thus offered a total of seven options, 
and the possibility of taking this as an examination subject was made available to all 
students. Because RK was considered an examinable subject with a prescribed syllabus, 
it raised a host of further issues surrounding training teachers, creating spaces for 
instruction, devising the syllabus, organizing course material and developing textbooks. 
      As expected there were concerns that the teaching of RK would turn into “conversion 
sessions” (The Straits Times, 4 March 1983). The Ministry of Education assured parents 
that it would closely monitor the teaching of RK to ensure that the system would not be 
abused. Interestingly, it was also suggested that parents who feared conversion of their 
children to other faiths could choose either “World Religions” or “Confucian Ethics” as 
these were viewed as “neutral options.”  
      The entire enterprise, however, turned out to be short-lived and was abandoned in 
1989, amidst – once again – objections to a secular state’s involvement in religious 
instruction for its citizenry. The prevailing view deemed that the imparting of religious 
values was a parental responsibility. The educational gap was filled by a newly constituted 
subject called “Civic and Moral Education” (introduced on 23 February 1991) to cultivate 
citizens who would embrace Singapore’s “Shared Values.” Students would be taught to 
place society above the individual and to prioritize racial and religious harmony above all 
else. Consequently, the syllabus focused on strengthening inter-ethnic and inter-religious 
tolerance, civic and social responsibility, enshrining the family as foundational and strongly 
endorsing commitment to the nation.   
       Post 9/11, governments the world over have articulated caution vis-à-vis religious 
extremism. Government leaders in Singapore have expressed similar anxieties and called 
for greater tolerance, understanding and awareness amongst members of different 
religious communities. Various schemes, some governmental and others through private 
initiatives, have been formulated to achieve better inter-religious appreciation and 
understanding. These include visits to places of worship, talks on various religions and co-
operative ventures between different religious communities. Notably Hindus and Buddhists 
have organized joint Vesak Day Celebrations, and Catholics and Muslims have come 
together to celebrate Christmas and Hari Raya (The Straits Times, 28 December 2001). 
These state and community led efforts aim to educate Singaporeans about “other” 
religions on the assumption that correct information will prevent stereotyping, 
misconceptions and discrimination and ensure religious harmony and thus political 
stability.  
       From its inception as a modern nation-state, Singapore’s leaders have actively  
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engaged the management of a religiously and ethnically plural citizenry. For the most part, 
the preference has been for institutional and legislative measures. By and large, these 
safeguards have prevented the irresponsible expression of communal tensions, though 
the latter may be present. From this point of view, the measures – many of which are 
punitive (such as warnings, fines, and imprisonment) – have served their purpose.  Recent 
events, however, have raised questions (even at government level) regarding the 
adequacy of such an approach. Critical in this respect is a shifting emphasis away from 
institutional mechanisms (which still remain) and towards everyday actions, which forge 
inter-personal ties and increase interaction amongst members of different religions. A 
more informed understanding of other religions is able to develop alongside an awareness 
that multi-religiosity is not merely the listing and counting of discrete religious communities. 
The process must include the mutual respect and non-judgmental understanding of one 
community for another. It is equally clear that after some 50 years of multicultural nation 
building, policies for managing the continuing racial and religious diversity on the island 
are likely to evolve further. This is a work in progress. 
 
Sidebar 16.4 
 
Managing Religious Diversity in the United States 
Nancy Ammerman 
 
       Foundational to the cultural identity of the United States is a “creation myth” that 
begins with the journey of seventeenth-century religious “pilgrims” who arrived in North 
America seeking freedom to practice religious beliefs for which they faced persecution in 
Europe.  This story of the search for religious liberty is widely shared in American society, 
but its meaning continues to animate arguments about the relationship between religions 
and the law and about how diverse religious groups can live together. 
       It was not an auspicious beginning. Those pilgrims achieved their freedom by 
occupying new territory, sweeping indigenous populations to the side, and excluding 
religious others. In the ensuing two centuries, however, the continent was occupied by 
increasingly diverse sets of people, and by the time the American Constitution came into 
being, no single religious group could claim dominance. The First Amendment prohibited 
the “establishment” of any religion by the new federal state and enshrined individual “free 
exercise” as one of the country’s foundational human rights. 
       There is a long and tangled legal history surrounding the interpretation of those two 
constitutional protections (Greenawalt 2009), but culturally, the impulse to allow free 
religious expression to the individual, and not to establish any single privileged religious 
group, has resulted in a nation whose range of religious traditions is vast. No definitive 
religious census of the population exists, but in 2010 the Association of Statisticians of 
American Religious Bodies gathered data on the number of congregations (344,894) and 
their adherents (150,596,792) spanning almost 250 distinct religious groups.  
       Until the 1960s, that diversity largely existed within a Protestant Christian hegemony, 
although cultural power had begun to expand to include Jews and Catholics.1 Changes in 
immigration law (enacted in 1965) brought not only more Christians from outside the North 
Atlantic but significant numbers of Hindus, Buddhists, Sikhs, and especially Muslims into 
the mix.2 Cultural shifts in the early 21st century have also increased the number of people 
without religious affiliation (the “nones”).3 Protestants, meanwhile, have lost their majority 
position, even as their historical shaping of the culture remains visible. The reality of  
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16.3.3 The governance of religious diversity 
As set out in Chapter 2 of this Report, social progress depends on establishing civil 
societies where people of diverse heritage can not only work and live together, but also 
flourish in each other’s company. Each society, moreover, must find a way forward within 
 
religious diversity is both mourned and celebrated. 
       Conflicts among religious and nonreligious groups have been ubiquitous in U.S. 
history, but have not generally divided the society into warring camps. In everyday 
interactions, lines of religious difference are largely moderated by norms of privacy and 
respect, as they are in Europe. Putnam and Campbell (2010) have argued, in fact, that 
bridging ties are created because Americans are likely to have friends, co-workers, and 
even family members who are religiously different both from themselves and from each 
other.  
       Some conflicts are, however, more difficult and have propelled interpersonal, 
economic, and rights disputes into the public eye. The issues have ranged from whether 
religious groups can sacrifice animals to whether employers can forbid religious clothing 
and jewelry. Americans may not always agree on the answers, but they generally agree on 
the procedures for settling the matter. Only on rare occasions has the clash between 
religious groups and surrounding neighbors or authorities resulted in death and 
destruction.4  Both law and custom have tended to keep interreligious violence in check.  
And as in other modern nation-states a de facto multiculturalism prevails (Joppke and 
Morawska 2014).  
       The other distinct consequence of the American legal pattern is the fact that religious 
organizations are voluntarily organized and supported with minimal state involvement. 
They are also presumptively legitimate, meaning that local religious communities allow 
minorities legal spaces for cultural expression. A significant body of research has 
documented the degree to which “congregations” (and their equivalents in new traditions) 
have facilitated immigrant incorporation.5 
       Even as norms of religious tolerance are deeply engrained in the society, people who 
have exclusivist religious beliefs sometimes doubt that religious diversity is good for the 
country. In a post-9/11 context of fear, religious restrictions, insults, and even violence 
have become more likely. And even as generational cohort replacement and political 
history would predict an increasingly open and tolerant country, the shape of immigrant 
trends and the global sense of threat are undermining those norms. The cultural, 
bureaucratic, and legal mechanisms that have largely kept religious diversity from erupting 
into major conflict are being tested – just as they are in Europe. 
 
 
1 This tripartite religious “establishment” was famously described by Will Herberg in his Protestant-
Catholic-Jew (Herberg 1960). 
2 An excellent introduction to this shift can be found in the collection of articles edited by Prothero 
(2006). 
3 A full overview of current religious demographics is contained in Pew’s “America’s Changing 
Religious Landscape” report (2015). 
4 There was, for example, both anti-Catholic and anti-Mormon violence in the 19th century, and more 
recently a government assault on a disliked religious group in Waco, Texas. 
5 See especially the argument by Warner (1999) and, as one example, the research by Kniss and 
Numrich (2007). 
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the parameters set by its past. For this reason, “progress” will look different in different 
places. Here we look at two ways of achieving this goal: sets of ideas captured by the terms 
“multiculturalism” and “secularism”.  
16.3.3.1. Understanding multiculturalism 
The idea of multiculturalism has been introduced in Chapter 15. It is a term with 
multiple meanings. At one level it is part of an expanding cultural market, allowing the 
discerning consumer to pick and choose from an increasing range of cultural goods (food, 
clothing, art, music, and so on). Very different in valance is the notion of multiculturalism as 
an inherently divisive process that damages—necessarily—the dominant or host culture.  
Tariq Modood, a prominent British scholar captures these dilemmas in a summary 
article published in The Guardian (Modood 2011). In this, Modood notes that the growing 
assertion of strongly held religious identities struck many as “too multicultural,” not at all the 
friendly differences in music or food previously celebrated. The timing is important. The 
article came in the context of a high profile statement by the then UK Prime Minister 
indicating that multiculturalism had failed. Similar misgivings were felt in France and 
Germany—a trend that continues. Indeed it is sentiments such as these that encourage the far-
right movements that are currently gaining purchase in many parts of Europe, exacerbated by 
the unexpected influx of migrants arriving in Europe from the Middle East. The flow peaked 
in 2015; the political consequences began to unfold in 2016.18 
The authors of Chapter 15 offer a solution—or more accurately a way of thinking—
which, once again, is echoed by Modood: that is to see the building of a multicultural society 
as a process in which new ideas and new ways of doing things are constantly drawn into the 
mainstream, which is itself reconstituted—continually so. Many different actors have a part 
to play in this demanding task. Among them are religious organizations at every level of 
                                                        
18 See Section 16.3.2 above, as well as Sidebar 16.1. 
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society and the myriad ordinary individuals that inhabit them. Public communication and 
mutual education, along with “street level ecumenism” (working side by side) are often more 
effective than dialogue between elites, both religious and secular, in securing positive 
outcomes.19 
16.3.3.2. Secularism and the liberal state 
 Secularism is a similarly flexible concept, and it too is contentious. A complex 
terminology has evolved in this field to distinguish forms of secularism that seek to 
accommodate difference from their more radical counterparts which exclude the presence of 
religion on principle from the public square. Rowan Williams (2012) terms the former 
“procedural” secularism and the latter “programmatic” secularism. Modood (2013) prefers 
“moderate” and “radical”, but the distinction is similar. 
In her path-breaking work in this field, Cécile Laborde (2017) opens up the debate in 
new ways. She starts from the following question: should the liberal state necessarily be 
secular? In her response, she argues that there is indeed a minimal secularism—or separation 
between state and religion—that is required by the liberal state, but that secularism is more 
complex than is often thought. Specifically, it is incorrect to assume that liberal democracy 
requires the strict separation of state and religion that is found in the French or the U.S. 
model.  
In reaching this conclusion, Laborde follows the argument of this chapter in that she 
underlines that religion is more—much more—than a statement of belief about what is true, 
or a code of moral and ethical conduct. Religion refers equally to ways of living, to political 
theories of justice, to modes of voluntary association, and to vulnerable collective identities. 
Thus, Laborde disaggregates religion into its various dimensions, and in so doing dispenses 
                                                        
19 Singapore provides an instructive example of religious and state actors working together in a multicultural 
society. See Sidebar 16.3. 
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with the Western, Christian-inflected conception of religion that liberal political theory relies 
on, particularly with reference to the separation between religion and state. As a result, there 
is considerably more variation in permissible state-religion arrangements than either secular 
liberals or religiously minded liberals have often assumed—a flexibility that can be extended 
to non-Western societies.20 It is with this flexibility in mind, that we turn to democracy itself. 
                                                        
20 The Indian case offers an important and much-discussed example of the application of secularism to a non-
Western society. See Sidebar 16.5. 
Sidebar 16.5 
 
India: The World’s Largest Democracy 
Vineeta Sinha 
 
 
       India – with a population exceeding 1.2 billion – defines itself unequivocally as a 
secular state. But it has a population that is far from secularized. According to the 2011 
Census, Hindus constitute about 80 percent of the population followed by Muslims at 14 
percent, and smaller numbers of Christians, Sikhs, Buddhists and Jains. Less than 1 
percent of the population declares itself to have “no religion.” The Constitution is the 
supreme authority and articulates both the fundamental right of the individual citizen to 
religious freedom (Articles 15 and 25) and the right of religious communities to manage 
their own affairs (Article 26) – with the caveat that the state has the right to intervene in the 
religious domain in the preservation of national interests or if communal harmony is 
disrupted. The Indian state’s legitimacy rests on its declared equality of treatment of all its 
citizens. Above all an articulated secularism deems that the political authority of the state is 
located outside and beyond all other interests, such that it cannot be held hostage to the 
interests of any group, religious or otherwise. Against this background, two interrelated 
points demand attention: the notion of “secularism” as such and the threat to democracy 
constituted by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).  
       Given the historical and religious-cultural grounding of the concept, critics have argued 
that “secularism” is ethnocentric and that the various meanings attributed to it may not 
always be relevant, especially in non-western, non-Christian settings. The question has 
provoked an extensive literature on a variety of Asian contexts.1 Yet the ideas carried 
within the concept of “secularism” have not been rejected entirely. Alternative non-western 
varieties of the concept have been proposed even as it continues to be debated and re-
conceptualized in current scholarship. Nikki Keddie (2003: 242) goes further still, arguing 
that: “[N]o state yet seen has been purely secular, whether the word is used to mean state 
separation from religion or state control of religion.” One point, however, is abundantly 
clear in this discussion: secularism has been heavily politicized in the Indian context. 
       Since the early years of India’s independence, political and social scientists have 
vigorously debated the applicability of this concept to the subcontinent.2 India’s first Prime 
Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru shaped the contours of a secular India in enshrining religious 
freedoms to all its citizens and non-interference of the state in religious matters in its 
Constitution. That said, scholars have observed – quite correctly – that in practice 
Nehruvian secularism legitimized differential treatment of religious communities, granted 
“religious privileges” to some of these communities, and has been seen as a political 
ideology that practices “appeasement of religious minorities.”  
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       The critique of this version of “secularism” has been loudly expressed over many 
decades but even more so since the landslide electoral victory of the BJP in May 2014. A 
Hindu majoritarian government as well as clusters of Hindu citizenry have called for the 
removal of what are seen as “privileges” for religious minorities, for example state support 
for religious institutions and for the annual Haj pilgrimage for Muslims. There is a strong 
view that the Indian state is not secular enough in the sense of being rigorously “neutral” 
among contesting religious groups. The Indian legal system, for instance, accommodates 
different personal laws for different religious communities. Religion-specific laws apply in 
matters of marriage, divorce, adoption, and inheritance. Undoubtedly the co-presence of 
personal family law for Muslims, and the existence of religion-specific legislation and 
institutions, complicates the state’s claim to be secular.  
       The larger challenge in the Indian case comes from the link between national identity 
and a particular religion – Hinduism. Hindutva’ refers to Hindu principles or a Hindu way of 
life and has been interpreted as a form of Hindu nationalism which privileges a cultural 
notion of “Hindu.” As a political force, this is a banner under which the Hindu right in India 
fights for state power; it has been critical of the policies of the Indian state under Congress 
rule. It is, moreover, avowedly anti-Muslim and increasingly anti-Christian. It is organized 
around the Sangh Parivar (family of organizations) which is made up of the Rashtriya 
Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), a paramilitary, non-party Hindu nationalist organization 
founded in 1925 that has proved an efficient and effective organizer; the Bharatiya Janata 
Party (BJP), which is the electoral wing of the RSS, founded in 1980 as a religious 
nationalist party (currently in power under the premiership of Narendra Modi); and the 
Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP – World Hindu Council) which mobilizes religious institutions 
and personages both in India and abroad for what it sees as Hindu causes.  
       The BJP represents a Hindu consciousness as much as a nation state consciousness 
and asserts a deep affinity between Hindus and the nation state of India. It aims to 
monopolize political space and limit the civic participation of religious minorities. In 2013, 
the General Secretary of the BJP declared that, if elected, the BJP would institute anti-
conversion laws across the Indian nation. The BJP did indeed achieve a resounding victory 
in May 2014, but to date no such law has been enacted nation-wide. That said, numerous 
incidents across the nation suggest that Hindutva forces have been emboldened – 
sentiments expressed in a rising tide of intolerance, including the marginalization of non-
Hindu minorities. Continuing Hindu-Muslim and Hindu-Christian tensions, accompanied by 
harassment, violence, and discriminatory practices, have been met with silence and 
ineffective law enforcement from the central government, challenging the secular 
foundations of the Indian state.  
       It remains true that the Indian Constitution grants nominal protection to religious 
minorities, and that there are mechanisms in place charged with enforcing that protection. 
The Ministry of Minority Affairs was established in 2006; the National Commission for 
Minorities and National Human Rights Commission of India were established earlier, in 
1992 and 1993 respectively. These bodies function to investigate religious discrimination 
and persecution and to make recommendations for recourse to the local state-level 
authorities. However, incidents of persecution of Muslims and Christians as well as 
discrimination of Dalit communities have been on the rise since 2014. Thus the constitution 
commitment to the rights of religious minorities has in practice failed to protect such 
groups, undermining – once again- the Inidan state’s claim to be a secular democracy. In 
the contemporary context, religious minorities have expressed that they have neither the 
political nor cultural space to participate as full citizens in the world’s “largest democracy.” 
       Interestingly, however, clusters of Indians who see themselves as “secular Hindus” 
note that the current political climate ultimately threatens India’s pluralist and tolerant 
democracy. Challenges to dissent and disagreement with government policies in the 
current political and ideological climate are viewed as “anti-nationalist” and “anti-Hindu” 
given the BJP construction of India as a “Hindu” nation. Such challenges place under  
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16.3.4 Religion and democratic governance 
Inequalities across religious groups, like other inequalities, can pose challenges to 
democracy. Chapter 14 develops this theme in detail and concludes by advocating a 
“principled distance” between the state and religion. As Section 16.3.3 makes clear, there are 
various models for that relationship. In what follows the argument is turned in a slightly 
different direction in order to ask what the social scientific literature tells us about the role of 
different forms of religion in the development and maintenance of participatory democracy 
(see Chapter 9). It begins with a historical perspective. 
Different religious traditions have at different times been identified as either 
providing the foundations for democratic governance or constituting impediments to it. For 
instance, Alexis de Tocqueville wrote that Catholics “constitute the most republican and the 
most democratic class of citizens which exists in the United States.” The reason for this, he 
argued, was Catholicism’s emphasis on equality: “[T]he Catholic faith places all human 
capacities upon the same level; it subjects the wise and ignorant, the man of genius and the 
vulgar crowd, to the details of the same creed; it imposes the same observances upon the rich 
and needy, it inflicts the same austerities upon the strong and the weak, it listens to no 
compromise with mortal man, but, reducing all the human race to the same standard, it 
confounds all the distinctions of society at the foot of the same altar.” (de Tocqueville 1898: 
384). 
 
tremendous strain not only India’s long-standing and deeply embedded religious diversity 
and its secular democracy, but the pluralism within Hinduism itself. 
 
 
1  See for example, Heng and Liew’s (2010) edited volume which covers a range of Asian examples. 
2 Notable contributions to the debate include Irfan Engineer (1995), T. N. Madan (1987), Nandy (1990) 
and Tejani (2008). Edited volumes by Srinivasan (2007), Needham and Sunder Rajan (2007) and 
Bhargava (1998) highlight the difficulties that have arisen in this field. 
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More than 100 years later, sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset came to a diametrically 
opposed conclusion regarding the compatibility of Catholicism and democracy (Lipset 1959: 
93). Lipset argued that democracy requires a political belief system that accommodates 
competition among ideas, while the Catholic Church claims that it alone has the truth. 
Catholic countries, he contended, were particularly prone to instability and were inhospitable 
to the kind of compromise and pluralism that lie at the heart of democracy. 
Temporal and spatial variation in the democratic fortunes of Catholic-majority 
countries in Latin America, Southeast Asia, sub-Saharan Africa, and southern Europe 
demonstrate that both de Tocqueville and Lipset were wrong in assigning either democratic 
or anti-democratic essences to the Catholic faith. However, similar arguments continue to be 
invoked with respect to other religions—most notably, Islam. Here the record is primarily a 
negative one, with thinkers over several generations arguing that Islam is inherently 
inhospitable to democratic government. For instance, Montesquieu declared that “The 
moderate government is better suited to the Christian religion, and despotic government to 
Mohammedanism,” on account of the “gentleness so recommended in the gospel,” which he 
contrasted to the “despotic fury” that allegedly characterized the behavior of “Mohammedan 
princes” (Montesquieu 1748[2001]: 468).  
More recently, political historian Elie Kedourie wrote that, “[T]he ideas of the 
secularity of the state, of society being composed of a multitude of self-activating, 
autonomous groups and associations—all these are profoundly alien to the Muslim political 
tradition” (Kedourie 1992: 6). Similarly, Samuel P. Huntington invoked Islam itself to 
explain why few Muslim-majority countries transitioned to democracy during the so-called 
“Third Wave” of democratization that began in the 1970s. “To the extent that governmental 
legitimacy and policy flow from religious doctrine and religious expertise,” he wrote, 
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“Islamic concepts of politics differ from and contradict the premises of democratic politics” 
(Huntington 1991: 28).  
Although several Muslim countries have been able to construct and sustain 
democracy—including Indonesia, Senegal, Turkey, and most recently, Tunisia—arguments 
about the incompatibility of Islam and democracy continue to carry influence. Here the 
evidence requires careful scrutiny. Cross-national, country-level statistical analyses continue 
to reveal a positive correlation between the proportion of a country’s population that is 
Muslim and its propensity toward authoritarianism (see for example, Fish 2002; Donno and 
Russet 2004); however more fine-grained studies carried out at the individual level have 
failed to validate the skepticism toward Islam’s democratic prospects. 
For instance, in a study of mass attitudes toward religion and democracy in Algeria, 
Egypt, Morocco, and the Palestinian territories in the 1980s and 1990s, Marc Tessler (2002: 
350) found that “Islam is not the obstacle to democratization that some western and other 
scholars allege it to be.” And in a thorough analysis of cross-national data from the World 
Values Survey, Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart (2011: 134) find that “surprisingly similar 
attitudes toward democracy are found in the West and the Islamic world.” Similarly, Amaney 
Jamal (2006: 59), analyzing a subset of these survey data from Egypt and Jordan, argues that 
“the dichotomization of Islam and democracy is a false construct,” as evidenced by the fact 
that “the vast majority of respondents in both Egypt and Jordan demonstrate simultaneous 
support for both Islam and democracy.” More recently, a study of attitudes toward democracy 
in ten Muslim-majority countries conducted by Sabri Ciftci (2010: 1460) found that greater 
adherence to Islamic precepts is unrelated to support for democracy, which “is remarkably 
high, and … independent of ‘sectarian’ or theological traditions across the Muslim world.” 
Similar findings have been recorded by Hoffman (2004) and Stepan and Robertson (2003). In 
short, individual-level support for democracy is widespread among the world’s Muslims. 
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Moving beyond specific religious traditions, scholars have attempted to explore 
whether religion itself is conducive or unconducive to democracy. On the one side are 
scholars who believe that religions inculcate intolerance toward alternative Weltanschauungs 
and instill in their followers norms of obedience and deference to authority, rendering them 
inhospitable to democracy and individual liberty. We have seen variants of this view above in 
arguments about Islam and Catholicism. On the other side are scholars who identify religious 
social institutions as schools for the “the development of civic skills and norms that can have 
a positive effect on support for democracy” (Bloom and Arikan 2013). Political scholarship 
in the American context has revealed how religious organizations can channel individuals 
into democratic politics (R. L. Wood 2002; Schlozman, Verba, and Brady 2012).  
In a study of more than 60,000 survey respondents in 54 countries, Bloom and Arikan 
(2013) try to adjudicate between these two views and instead find support for both of them. 
Certain religious values appear to instill unfavorable attitudes toward democracy, while 
participation in religious social networks appears to be positively associated with some forms 
of support for democracy. As we argue throughout this chapter, “religion” has multiple 
dimensions, and attention to ground-level practices may reveal a different picture from the 
view at the level of ideas and theologies.  
This suggests that it is important to move beyond the level of individual values and 
examine the role that religious groups play in enabling or inhibiting the emergence of 
democratic political orders. For example, Toft, Philpott, and Shah (2011) have argued that 
democracy is more likely to emerge and survive when religious actors are included in transition 
processes, instead of being viewed as hostile forces to be contained. In the Arab context, 
recent scholarship has shown that so-called Islamist parties—previously thought to be 
opposed to democracy and individual liberty—have emerged as some of the region’s 
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foremost exponents of democratic political arrangements (Wickham 2013), even as the space 
for such arrangements has constricted in recent years.  
In the Latin American case, the Catholic Church’s development of “liberation 
theology” was accompanied by the practice of organizing “base Christian communities” in 
which local citizens articulated their daily life concerns and organized to advocate for change 
(Roelofs 1988; Gill 1998; Smilde 2003). A further point should however be noted. In the 
democratic conflicts of Latin America, the involvement of religion is many-sided. In 
Venezuela, for example, the Catholic hierarchy has been a key actor opposing  
the socialist project of Chavismo. Yet clerics influenced by liberation theology have provided 
significant support to that project. Similarly Neo-Pentecostal Protestants have supported 
Chavismo, while traditional Protestant groups have not (see Sidebar 16.6).  
Thus the overwhelming impression conveyed by these and other cases is that religions 
(or religion in general) are neither inherently pro- nor anti-democratic, left nor right, or even 
for religious freedom nor against it. Each situation must be examined on its own terms.  
Sidebar 16.6 
 
Religious Diversity and Democratic Changes in 
Venzuela 
David Smilde and Isabella Chojnacki1 
 
 
      “Democracy” is not simply a term that analysts use to describe the political fields that 
they study; it is equally a normative – and at times highly charged – term used by political 
and religious actors, complicating simplistic assumptions that religion or religions line up 
either with or against democratic or anti-democratic protagonists. 
      With increasing electoral enfranchisement across the globe in the past thirty years, 
long-marginalized majorities have been able to express their wills at the ballot box and 
frequently challenge existing regimes long controlled by minorities. While to suggest we 
are in a “world on fire” (Chua 2002) seems overstated, democratization has ironically 
contributed to processes of political polarization in contexts that range from Turkey to 
Nepal to Venezuela.  
       In traditionally-Catholic Venezuela, the “democratic revolution” started by the election 
of Hugo Chávez Frias in 1998 has generated a process of polarization and debate that has 
involved – and spilled into – a variety of Christian groups. Both the Catholic Church and 
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the Evangelical movement suffered internal polarization with respect to the Chavez 
revolution. From the beginning of his campaign in 1998 Hugo Chávez reached out to 
Evangelicals. And once in office he attempted to grant them favors, such as allowing them 
to impart religious education in public schools and diverting to them some of the funds that 
the Catholic Church received for its work in education and other social services. 
       The main Evangelical associations proceeded with caution, concerned about being 
coopted. In particular they objected when the government tried to bring them into the 
“Bolivarian Religious Parliament” along with groups that they reject, such as spiritists and 
practitioners of the faith Maria Lionza. However, Evangelicals are diverse, and Neo-
Pentecostal groups embraced these opportunities, receiving funds from the Chávez 
government to carry out social services. One pastor gained a spot for religious programs 
on state television. Another coalition organized Evangelical rallies in favor of Chávez 
before the August 2004 recall referendum, which Chávez eventually defeated. Neo-
Pentecostal “dominion theology,” which suggests Christians need to prepare the world for 
Christian rule, grafted easily onto Chávez’s anti-imperial nationalism (Smilde and Pagan 
2011). 
       However, all Evangelical collaboration with the Chávez government diminished when 
the government banished the New Tribes Missions, which for decades had caused 
controversy with their programs of evangelization in Venezuela’s Amazon region. On the 
“Day of Indigenous Resistance” in October 2006, the government prohibited this US based 
group from working in Venezuela (Smilde 2007b). Even Neo-Pentecostal groups had a 
hard time assimilating this banishment and thereafter cooled their relations with the 
government.  
       From the first year of the Chávez government, the Catholic Church emerged as its 
most important critic, bristling at the revolutionary, third- worldist rhetoric that portrayed 
existing institutions, including the Church, as the bulwarks of an unequal society. Distrust 
peaked after 2002 when the Catholic hierarchy appeared to take an important role in the 
coup that pushed Chávez from power for 36 hours. Cardinal Ignacio Velasco was the first 
person to sign the decree forming a short-lived transition government. 
       In those same events, however, alternative Catholic movements were central in 
frustrating the coup. For example, the Jesuit network of “Fe y Alegría” community radio 
stations were key in breaking the media silence surrounding the coup and in showing the 
growing discontent in the streets. That was important in accelerating the movement that 
brought Chávez back to power (Smilde and Pagan 2011). Indeed, throughout the Chávez 
period, many foreign priests working directly with Catholic communities rather than under 
the authority of the Venezuelan Church actively supported the Chávez government and its 
various participatory projects (Smilde 2013). And in the second term of the Chavez 
presidency, the Church as a whole took on a more conciliatory stance. 
       In response to the cycle of protests that broke out in February 2014 and lasted several 
months, the Vatican, along with the Union of Southern Nations (UNASUR), sponsored 
dialogues between the government and its opposition. These dialogues failed to achieve 
any tangible agreements. But they did get the government and opposition to sit down 
together for the first time in ten years. After the Maduro government cancelled the recall 
referendum in October 2016, the Vatican again facilitated talks between the government 
and the opposition. When the agreements reached were not honored by the government, 
the Vatican sent a private letter to both sides in the conflict laying out four conditions for 
their continued involvement: measures taken to address Venezuela’s shortages of food 
and medicines, an electoral calendar, recognition of the National Assembly, and relief for 
political prisoners. When these conditions were not met, the Vatican withdrew its special 
envoy, Monsignor Claudio Maria Celli, in January 2017 (Smilde 2017). 
       From that point on the Vatican took a backseat role in the Venezuelan conflict which 
only worsened. The cycle of protest from April to July 2017, which claimed 130 lives, 
generated a significant flow of statements from the Venezuelan Catholic hierarchy. These 
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16.3.5 Conclusion 
The careful management of religious diversity and the need to build just and effective 
systems of government in which different forms of religion can not only find a place, but 
flourish, are central to social progress. In both respects, the challenges are considerable and 
the rewards great, but the cost of failure is high. The following section continues this story 
paying close attention to the circumstances in which religious conflict and violence are likely 
        
statements openly opposed the government’s push for a Constituent Assembly, 
encouraged the population to protest peacefully, and criticized the government’s 
repressive crackdowns. During all of this there were frequent manifestations of unity 
between the Venezuelan hierarchy and the Vatican, including a meeting between the Pope 
and a contingent of Venezuelan bishops when he visited Colombia that Fall. 
       There has been considerable anticipation that the Vatican could play an important role 
in response to the current political crisis. Indeed the Vatican’s participation in the 2016 
dialogue came at the request of both parties to the conflict (Smilde and Pérez Hernáiz 
2016a). Francis is the first Latin American Pope and has taken an interest in long standing 
conflicts in the region. The Vatican played a key role in the diplomatic breakthrough 
between the United States and Cuba, and the Vatican’s foreign minister Pietro Parolin was 
the Nuncio in Venezuela before he was tapped by Francis. The Jesuits (from which 
Francis comes) are politically the most important religious order in Venezuela. However, 
the tensions between Pope Francis and conservative bishops worldwide over his reforms 
to Catholic moral teachings -- accepting communion for those who are divorced, 
acceptance into the faith of the children of unmarried parents, and recognition of 
homosexuals (Brown 2017) – have an impact on the Vatican’s ability to work in Venezuela 
(Armando.info December 20, 2015, Smilde and Pérez Hernáiz 2016b). Venezuela’s 
Cardinal Jorge Urosa Sabino was one of eleven Cardinals to publish essays on marriage 
and the family, which were critical of Pope Francis’s thinking on these issues, just a month 
before the Vatican synod on the family in October 2015 (Aymans 2015). 
       Thus the complexity of Christian engagement in Chavismo in Venezuela demonstrates 
that there can be no simple, deductive understandings of religion’s engagement with 
democracy. As we have argued in this chapter, religious meaning systems, practices, 
institutions and leaders exist in concrete historical contexts and have their own logic that 
sometimes supports, and sometimes opposes, various forms of “democratization.” More 
often, following its own purposes, it cross-cuts democratic processes, rendering religious 
actors only partially relevant. Evangelicals largely withdrew from engaging the Chávez and 
now Maduro governments once the New Tribes Missions were asked to leave in 2006. The 
Vatican’s potential role in the Venezuelan conflict is complicated by disagreements with 
the Venezuelan hierarchy over moral issues. Religious movements and institutions are 
relevant to democratization, but they run on different tracks from political organizations, 
and only sometimes have a central political role. 
 
 
 
1 Isabella Chojnacki is a student at Tulane University majoring in Sociology and International 
Relations. She is interested in religion, socialism and Eastern Europe. 
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to ensue. Such situations include insensitive approaches to diversity and the discriminatory 
policies of repressive (often secular) states. 
16.4 Religion, conflict and peace 
Social progress is all too often halted by violence and aggression that deprive 
individuals and communities of the necessary conditions for seeking just, equitable, and 
peaceful ways of life. Conflicts over resources and power are often intertwined with conflicts 
over values and identity, and religions are often visibly implicated, exacerbating the 
difficulties. The rise of brutal violence both in the Middle East and on the streets of Western 
capitals is but the most recent evidence. At the same time, religious groups are themselves 
victims of violence and persecution.  
The relationship between religion and violence runs in multiple directions. Religious 
leaders and institutions are not just combatants, but are often key players in negotiating terms 
of post-conflict reconciliation, transitional justice, and even gang intervention. All world 
religions encompass representations and rituals of both peace-making and violence. As 
Christian Smith (1996a: 1) argues, religion has a “disruptive, defiant [and] unruly face.” It 
can break with existing social configurations and alter existing equilibriums. We should 
expect therefore that just as religion can often be a key factor in turning social and political 
tensions into violent struggle, it can also facilitate negotiation and coexistence in seemingly 
hopeless situations. Critical assessment of the potential for both good and ill can lay the 
foundation for fruitful collaborations. 
In what follows we look first at religion as a source of conflict and violence, 
scrutinizing complex evidence and paying particular attention to sites and conditions in which 
a negative outcome is likely. We then consider the very real ways in which religions and 
religious organizations contribute to reconciliation and peace-making both formally and less 
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formally. The section concludes with an overview of international institutions advancing 
religion, peace, and human rights.  
16.4.1 Religion as a source of conflict and violence  
Following the Cold War, an intrinsic link between religion and violence was 
hypothesized as one of the main factors affecting the international world order. Samuel 
Huntington’s The Clash of Civilizations (1996) argued that the “fault lines” between 
civilizations indicated future lines of conflict. The ideological conflict of the communist 
period would be replaced, he predicted, by religious and ethnic differences which drew on 
long standing animosities accumulated during previous centuries. Religion, in this view, was 
prone to inducing violent conflicts due to both historical tensions and the emergence of new 
international identities. Mark Juergensmeyer made a prediction similar to Huntington’s, but 
in a somewhat different direction. He argued that the post-1989 period would see “A New 
Cold War” pitting religious nationalism against the secular state. Furthermore, “Even though 
virtually all religions preach the virtues of non-violence, it is their ability to sanction violence 
that gives them political power” (1993: 164). 
These relatively recent speculations about religion and violence have emerged in the 
midst of vast global and political change, but have their roots much earlier. Scott 
Montgomery and Daniel Chirot (2015: 6) claim that the circulation of ideas after the 
Enlightenment forms a constitutive part of the ways in which societies engage with violence. 
Specifically, “If earlier upheavals of the social order sought their legitimacy in theology, law, 
and tradition, from the eighteenth century onward such changes were powered by ideas that 
were secular and that looked to found society and its institutions on concepts presumably 
anchored in an evidence-based, reason-led ‘scientific’ understanding of man and the 
universe.” Michael Barnett et al. (2015: 19) take a similar view: namely that the Western 
social science literature has systematically built on the assumption that “religion is a principal 
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source of violence and instability.” The post-Westphalian world system is assumed to be 
secular at the expense of religion, which has been regarded as the root of state violence 
(Juergensmeyer 2011). Barnett et al. (2015: 26) go on to note the Enlightenment belief that 
liberalism would tame “the religious beast.”  
Religious violence—it seems—stands out because it does not have the same claim to 
legitimacy that secular violence appears to have. Indeed, the dominant social-scientific 
narratives regarding religion and violence are Eurocentric insofar as they give states the 
benefit of the doubt while regarding religious groups guilty until proven innocent. The 
international system which emerged after the 1648 Peace of Westphalia endorsed the state as 
the main actor. As a result, the use of violence has been interpreted differently for religions 
than for secular states as they interact in the international arena.  
The reality, however, is that secular states and ideologies have carried out as much 
violence as the “religious beast” in recent centuries, if not more. Analyses of state conflicts 
since 1900 demonstrate that political (secular) ideologies and modern nationalisms have been 
more widely implicated in violent conflicts than have religions. The situation, however, is 
nuanced. Jonathan Fox used the State Failure Dataset to examine 161 countries and their 
involvement in religious conflicts between 1950 and 1996. He demonstrated that although 
they “[occurred] less often than other types of conflicts, religious conflicts have increased 
[during this period], and are more intense than nonreligious conflicts” (Fox 2004). A similar 
conclusion was reached by Susanna Pearce (2005) who examined 278 “territorial conflict 
phases” between 1946 and 2001 documented in the Armed Conflict Dataset available at the 
International Peace Research Institute in Oslo. Pearce pointed out that “religious conflicts are 
more intense than other types of conflicts,” but only, “under specific conditions,” suggesting 
that education, eschatological perceptions of the world (expecting an imminent cataclysmic 
end), and identity crises could all affect levels of violence. Taken together, this evidence 
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indicates that religious passions are often mobilized in situations of violent conflict, but 
careful assessment is necessary in order to discern exactly how religions are involved. 
Analysis should not begin with assumptions that any one religion has more capacity 
for violence than others. The employment of violence either symbolically or physically has 
been present in all world religions and across many historical periods (Girard 1979; 
Cavanaugh 2009; Ross 2011; Ghassem-Fachandi 2012; Juergensmeyer, Kitts, and Jerryson 
2013; Leustean 2014). In some cases—such as anti-Muslim violence by Hindus in India or 
Buddhists in Myanmar—religious majorities foment violence against rival religious groups. 
In many other cases—for example the Lord’s Resistance Army (a quasi-Christian cult in 
northern Uganda and surrounding states) or Boko Haram (an Islamist group in northern 
Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin)—radical offshoots take up arms in ways deemed heretical 
by more mainstream religious adherents. But in using their own powerful mix of ritual and 
ideology, they wreak havoc in the name of their god. The range of religious combatants and 
victims is broad indeed. 
A more systematic assessment of this range of religious conflict has led Jonathan Fox 
(2000: 15) to declare that “there is little evidence here to support the argument that Islam, or 
any religion for that matter, makes ethnoreligious minorities more conflict prone.” Using T.R. 
Gurr’s Minorities at Risk Phase 3 Dataset, Fox identifies 105 “ethnoreligious minorities,” 
namely ethnic communities which embrace a particular religion. The data indicate that the 
widespread perception that some religions (especially Islam) always endorse violence is 
incorrect. 
The stand-out form of violence in recent decades is perhaps religious terrorism—that 
is, religiously-motivated efforts to undermine legitimate authorities and advance political 
goals through fear and intimidation. Based on their analysis of the Global Terrorism 
Database, Toft, Philpott, and Shah (2011) note that since the 1980s, terrorism itself has been 
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on the rise, with religious motivations at the fore and Islam involved in the large majority of 
the attacks around the world. Still, civil wars are no less prevalent or destructive, and they are 
less dominated by religious motives. For the period 1940-2000, Toft (2006) counted 133 such 
struggles (where at least 1000 people died, with casualties on both sides). Only 42 of these 
involved religion, and in 17 of those, religion was a peripheral, rather than a central element. 
Religions can be implicated in different forms of violence in distinct and varied ways.  
16.4.1.1 Sites of potential religious tension 
If violence is not an inherent consequence of religion, it becomes important to ask 
about the particular sites in which destructive violence may arise. Contestation over the built 
environment and sacred spaces is one of these. It can involve multiple layers of religious and 
secular conflict, often with deep historical roots. Long histories of physical segregation can 
divide communities along lines of faith, class, or ethnicity, increasing the likelihood of 
mutual distrust. Consider, for example, attacks on Christian churches in Indonesia, most 
recently in the region of Aceh. In 2015 Muslim opponents threatened to burn down a church 
because, they argue, these churches were built without legal permits. The threat of violence 
(and it is worth noting that the threat itself is violent, even if the purported cause seems drily 
legalistic) has been consequential in many places in Indonesia causing numerous churches to 
be shut down. Such strategies have also been used to marginalize Christians in the Middle 
East.  
In the Indonesian case, there are clear connections to recent religious politics, but 
there is a deeper context to keep in mind, reflecting a colonial history of religious 
segregation. Dutch authorities, acting as secular powers, designated areas according to 
religion, and most importantly forbade Christian proselytization in Muslim areas (Birchok 
2016). Thus the appearance of Christian churches outside their “permitted” areas fuels a 
sense of righteous indignation among Muslims that for some justifies threats of violence. 
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Similarly, the desecration and re-appropriation of religious spaces in the Middle East 
indicates that the symbolism of centuries-old churches and monasteries remains a potent 
flashpoint. Saint Elijah’s Monastery in Iraq, founded in the sixth century by the Church of the 
East, was looted during the 2003 war, occupied by American forces, and then destroyed in 
2014 by ISIS.  
Likewise, nationalist politics were deeply intertwined in the reconstruction of 
religious spaces in Herzegovina. Incompatible nationalist views clashed: one promoting the 
equality of all traditional faiths in the region, and the other asserting a form of Catholic 
nationalism through aggressive claims on sacred spaces (Sells 2003). In other cases, 
relatively recent processes of religious or ethnoreligious segregation (often pursued by 
secular national authorities) disrupt access by some to previously shared resources like water, 
physical space, healthcare, or political representation (Appadurai 2000; Baird 2009; Parks 
2012). In these cases, sacred spaces become material representations not only of religious 
difference, but also of wider social inequities predicated on that difference, and thus develop 
into flashpoints for violent action.  
The regulation of religious diversity is yet another political sector where conflict can 
become violent. Grim and Finke (2011: 222) suggest that, as a general pattern, countries 
which suppress religious freedom have witnessed an increase in conflict, persecution and 
organized violence, whereas states which encourage freedom of religious expression are most 
successful in addressing organized violence. These authors analyzed patterns of religious 
persecution across the world, using data provided by the International Religious Freedom 
Reports issued by the U.S. State Department. Their review shows that religious persecution is 
on the increase. Contrary to the widespread perception that only a minority of countries 
engage in suppressing religious freedom, they found religious persecution in 86 percent of the 
cases. Between 2000 and 2007, 123 out of 143 countries had at least one documented case of 
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a person “physically abused or displaced from their homes because of a lack of religious 
freedom” (Grim and Finke 2011: 18).  
All of this suggests that high levels of violence in a society are likely to involve an 
interaction of political and religious forces. Fox (2000) argues that it is not militant “Islam,” 
but autocratic governments (which are disproportionately present in Islamic countries) that 
complicate the picture of Islam’s relationship to violent conflict. Saba Mahmood points to 
similar political and religious processes in postcolonial Egypt: here “secular governance has 
contributed to the exacerbation of religious tensions … hardening interfaith boundaries and 
polarizing religious differences” (2016: 1).  
Situations of autocratic governance and religious repression are seedbeds for religious 
tension, but so are secular states that fail to provide practical and cultural foundations for 
viable everyday life. Scholars have long argued that faith-based organizations are likely 
players in filling the gap left by states that do not provide for their citizens. In many cases 
that provision is beneficent, but it can also be brutally violent, as the examples of ISIS and 
Boko Haram make clear. When secular projects fail, some of the alternatives that appear will 
inevitably be religious (G. Wood 2015). With a monopoly on the use of force and no 
competition for means of governing, a violent religious movement can establish itself in 
territory otherwise neglected. 
16.4.1.2 Evaluating the evidence  
The general perception within the academic and policy-making world is that politics 
is rational while religion draws on the irrational and, thus, is “prone to violence” (Martin 
2011; 2014). This is not helpful; nor is the tendency to place all forms of religious violence 
under the same umbrella. As we have seen, there are ample symbolic resources within all 
religions to justify violence, and there is ample historic and contemporary evidence that 
violence can have a religious dimension. The question is not “Does religion cause violence?” 
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but under what circumstances, and in what ways. Religion is not an outside force that 
impinges upon secular social dynamics. Rather it is integrally and historically implicated in 
existing social configurations and their changes over time.  
A careful assessment of the particular religious ideas, symbols, rituals, and 
collectivities in play will help to identify particular points of danger. As we have seen, 
contestation over physical spaces is one such point, as is the repressive management of 
diverse religious populations. An excess of regulation can easily spill over into the kind of 
social and cultural conflict that erupts into violence either by or against religious minorities. 
At the same time state-centered efforts at protecting religious rights can turn religious 
differences into legal categories (Shakman Hurd 2015). Finally, situations of weak or failed 
secular states leave the door open for violent, religious, and authoritarian efforts to establish 
order. Thus assessing both vulnerable sites and the particular religious ideas and leaders 
arising from them is a critical preventive practice with respect to social progress. 
16.4.2 Religion as a resource for peace and reconciliation 
Religion has an important role in processes of conflict and violence, but it also plays a 
role in peace and reconciliation. Marc Gopin (1997) suggests that religion can often bring 
together conflictual parties by drawing on widely-shared religious values that provide the 
starting point toward peace negotiation. Religion is a prime marker not only in group identity 
but also in legitimating the pursuit of peace (Appleby 2000). Concepts of “justice,” 
“righteousness,” and “tolerance” are shared by many religions either at institutional or 
individual levels (Torrance 2006; Llewellyn and Philpott 2014).  
 A wide range of religious and secular organizations are involved in organized peace 
and reconciliation programs (Little 2007), with deep expertise residing in the World Council 
of Churches; the Interfaith Dialogue and Peacebuilding Program at the United States Institute 
of Peace; the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations at the U.S. State Department; 
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the International Center for Religion and Diplomacy in Washington, DC; and the Iraq Inter-
Religious Congress, a faith-based initiative for national reconciliation. The engagement of 
religious actors ranges from participating in group discussion to a more visible public 
presence in conflict zones. In the 1980s, faith-based communities built transnational networks 
to work for peace in Central America (C. Smith 1996b). During the 1989 violent 
demonstrations against the communist regime in Romania, religious symbols displayed in 
both private and public spaces supported the demonstrators; and during the 2013 Euromaidan 
demonstrations in Kiev, both priests and hierarchs placed themselves between the police and 
protesters. .  
Religious contributions to peace-building are often quite local and concrete. And just 
as sacred spaces can be sites of conflict, they can also become powerful sites for peaceful 
interaction. Shrines and pilgrimage sites can be shared by multiple faith communities 
(Emmett 1997; Albera and Couroucli 2012), even if that peaceful sharing may not always 
reflect perfectly harmonious relationships. Negotiating cultural differences about the 
appropriate use of sacred space requires considerable effort, but it can produce what 
DeBernardi (2009) calls “syncretic amity,” including the co-celebration of religious events. 
The visibility of sacred spaces in multi-religious environments over the long term can do 
much to counter social division and fears by making religion and its practices comprehensible 
to those outside the spiritual community itself. Similarly, sacred spaces can become sites of 
interfaith solidarity in response to terrorism. In 2011, for example, Muslims made a human 
chain around a Coptic Christian church to protect worshippers during Christmas Mass, and 
Egyptian Christians took similar action to protect Muslims at prayer. Flourishing societies in 
the future must take lessons from these public and visible opportunities to honor sacred 
spaces and communities across lines of difference. 
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In post-conflict situations, religious actors have played a similar role in transitional 
justice efforts. As civil society and political actors come together to deal with past violations 
of human rights, faith-based organizations have played significant roles in Chile (the 
Christian Churches’ Foundation for Social Assistance) (Ferrara 2015: 171) and in South 
Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Sitze 2013). Likewise, a wide range of local 
religious actors participated in Northern Ireland (Wells 2010), and a third party religious 
community, Sant’Egidio, brokered the 1992 peace accord in Mozambique (Anouilh 2005). 
Peacebuilding processes can draw on religious discourses and practices and the authority of 
local religious organizations, as evident in the reconstruction of war-torn societies in Sierra 
Leone (Martin 2016) and Libya (Lamont 2016) and the long-term struggle against 
authoritarianism and violence in Latin America (Wilde 2016). 
The role of religion in reconciliation can be seen in much more micro contexts as 
well. In Latin America, where an unabated crime wave has resulted in levels of violence as 
high as those of countries in civil war, religion has become one of the principal means by 
which people confront the associated challenges. Much of Latin America’s violence now 
takes the form of street crime, with young men involved in small-scale drug dealing and gang 
activity. Escaping the complex of substance abuse, crime, and violence is one of the most 
important factors generating the growth of Evangelical Protestantism in the region. 
Evangelicalism provides young men with a cultural logic of transformation that allows them 
to side-step the alternative logic of vendetta and navigate contexts of extreme violence 
(Burdick 1993; Smilde 2007a). More recent research has demonstrated the direct involvement 
of Evangelical groups in gang-exit in Central America. In Guatemala, Honduras, and El 
Salvador, gangs are almost impossible to exit alive. Those who try are hunted down and 
killed by gang members. But a convincing religious conversion is one of the few mechanisms 
that allow young men to find a way out. Some Evangelical ministries also provide tangible 
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services such as tattoo removal and relocation for former gang members in order to facilitate 
exit (Brenneman 2012). 
The effectiveness of Evangelical groups in gang prevention has, of course, been 
noticed by states and other actors charged with ensuring citizen security—and has therefore 
spurred multiple forms of “faith-based” initiatives. These have been criticized by some 
scholars who suggest that Pentecostal rehabilitation practices “ultimately silence structural 
forces while laying blame on individual action,” thereby justifying neoliberal reforms 
(O'Neill and Fogarty-Valenzuela 2015: 75; see also Pine 2009). These tensions between 
micro-level changes and the need for macro-level transformation are echoed in the range of 
religious organizations and practices themselves. In Central America, Catholic organizations 
focus more on gang prevention than exit, and see conversion and personal regeneration as 
relatively superficial compared to structural changes, such as access to education and jobs 
(Brenneman 2012). Nor is religious practice always benign. “Our Lady of the Holy Death” or 
La Santa Muerte in Mexico is venerated to give strength and faith to those who seek it to 
carry out crimes and violence, just as much as by those who seek to confront the chaos 
(Roush 2014). The same has been shown of Evangelicalism in contexts such as Jamaica and 
Brazil. In all of these cases, religious practices can provide strength to confront danger, 
whichever side of it you are on (Arias 2014). 
Religious practices, ideas, and organizations can, then, be valuable resources in 
seeking more peaceful societies, but careful and critical assessment remains key. While 
religious values can be brought into strategies of conflict resolution, understanding either 
peace-making or the conflicts themselves through the lens of religion is a culture-driven 
process that demands extensive local knowledge. Each group will see gestures of goodwill 
through its own system of symbols, which may be at odds with each other (Gopin 2003). Nor 
can religious symbols and practices overcome the absence of adequate economic structures 
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and a trustworthy state. A generalized reliance on external peace-building formulas, whether 
or not they involve religious actors, will falter in local contexts such as Congo, Kosovo, 
Sudan, and Rwanda (Autesserre 2014). Just as “religion” is not a generalized cause of 
violence, neither is it a universal panacea. 
16.4.3 Religion and human rights 
Running through our discussions of religion’s role in political and social life have 
been questions of human rights and how they are to be understood and implemented. “Human 
rights” is a defining discourse in the management of diversity, in the self-understanding of 
democracy, in the resolution of conflict, and in the fair distribution of resources. Across these 
domains, the relationship between human rights activists and religious groups runs the 
spectrum from active advocacy to open hostility.  
Foremost among international statements on the ways in which human beings should 
be treated at individual and community levels is the United Nations Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, adopted in 1948, which includes Article 18: “Everyone has the right to 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his 
religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or 
private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.” Thus 
freedom of religion and belief, in its current historical form, is seen as a fundamental and 
universally applicable right. Individuals (i.e. all human beings everywhere in the world) are 
the primary holders and beneficiaries of this right; states, conversely, are the primary holders 
of the correlative obligations (Lindholm, Durham Jr., Tahzib-Le, and Ghanea 2004: xxxvii). 
The establishment of a UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief 
implies recognition of both the importance and the difficulty of finding ways forward in 
places where diverse religious and secular norms are valued, and in situations where they 
may come into conflict—gender-specific abuses being among the most common. As an 
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independent expert appointed by the UN Human Rights Council, the Rapporteur’s role is to 
identify existing (and emerging) obstacles to the right to freedom of religion or belief and to 
present recommendations on the ways in which such obstacles might be overcome. Similarly, 
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe has addressed issues related to the 
freedom of religion and belief in its Warsaw-based Office for Democratic Institutions and 
Human Rights; and in May 2016, the European Commission appointed Former European 
Commissioner Ján Figeľ as the first Special Envoy for the promotion of freedom of religion 
or belief outside the European Union. Such institutional arrangements allow a forum for 
adjudicating the complex relationships between religious freedom and other human rights 
(Leustean and Madeley 2009; Haynes 2012).  
Here as elsewhere, social progress is facilitated by the kind of critical assessment an 
expert can provide. It is also facilitated by the imagination of human rights advocates who are 
willing to seek creative partnerships with faith-based organizations and religious leaders who 
share—and can translate—their goals. 
16.4.4 Conclusion 
At Rice University in April 2016, John Kerry, the US Secretary of State, summarized 
the contemporary tension between religion, conflict, and peace:  
Religion today remains deeply consequential, affecting the values, the actions, 
the choices, the worldview of people in every walk of life on every continent 
… It is a part of what drives some to initiate war, others to pursue peace; some 
to organize for change, others to cling desperately to old ways, resist 
modernity; some to reach eagerly across the borders of nation and creed, and 
others to build higher and higher walls separating one group from the next 
(Kerry 2016).  
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His words resonate with the research reported in this chapter. Religion is an aspect of human 
society that is not going to disappear anytime soon. It is neither inherently violent nor 
inherently peaceful, but includes practices, beliefs, values, and institutions that can lead in 
either direction. Assessment of the particular context and the particular religions in play is the 
first step toward social progress. Our evidence-based review of the relationship between 
religion and violence reveals the inherent complexity of any attempt to move past religious 
violence and engage religious strengths toward building a more peaceful world. An 
increasing number of international institutions have incorporated the interplay between 
religion and conflict resolution by emphasizing the universality of human rights as a common 
element spanning the world religions and other faith expressions. 
16.5. Everyday wellbeing: Economy, education, health, and development 
Structures of just and effective governance, along with the absence of violent conflict, 
are essential to social progress. Among the intended fruits of such structural change is the 
everyday wellbeing of populations—food and shelter, health and education, and the capacity 
to produce and share in economic goods in order to live in ways that are individually and 
communally valued (Sen 1999). These broader questions are explored in depth in other 
chapters in these volumes, but here we turn our attention to religion’s multifaceted role in this 
sphere. The wellbeing of persons and communities lies at the heart of much religious practice 
and teaching. Along with governments, philanthropic actors, and NGOs, religious institutions 
have a widespread grassroots presence in healthcare, education, and welfare provision. They 
are well-placed to be critical partners in the pursuit of social progress.  
This is an area of rapidly evolving research that has emerged as assumptions linking 
secularization with economic development have receded (Rakodi 2015). Some researchers 
have added standardized indicators of religion to statistical models that analyze economic 
capacity and wellbeing (Barro and McCleary 2003). Because religious belief and practice is 
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especially difficult to standardize, however, a more local and institutional approach holds 
greater promise. Much of our current knowledge comes, in fact, from relatively small case 
studies, findings from which are now being published in a clutch of excellent edited 
collections.21 While case studies pose challenges for generalization, they reflect the reality of 
the range of particularities relevant to the relationship between religion and material 
wellbeing.  
16.5.1 Religion and economic progress in less developed countries 
A century ago, Max Weber introduced the possibility that specific religious beliefs 
lead to ways of life with often unintended, but nevertheless important, economic 
consequences. He famously associated Protestant Christianity with the establishment of 
capitalist economies (Weber 1905[1958]). He expected, however, that as science and 
technology took hold in the capitalist West, the sense of divine imperative would disappear. 
However, in the West, as well as in many societies around the world, economic and 
technological pragmatism continues to exist in more or less comfortable coexistence with 
holistic spiritual concerns. Social development seems not—or not necessarily—to require 
secularization.  
When secular social change agents encounter a society seemingly dominated by belief 
in supernatural powers, it can appear an insurmountable obstacle, but as part of the social 
landscape, spiritual beliefs must be taken into account. From creation myths to harvest 
prayers and fertility rituals, human spirituality has long linked human flourishing to the 
supernatural. Throughout the world, spirits are understood to inhabit people’s everyday lives 
at least as powerfully as the forces of the market. While such beliefs can diminish the sense 
                                                        
21 See especially ter Haar (2011a), Tomalin (2015) and Clarke and Jennings (2008). 
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of personal and social agency, they can just as easily contain cultural resources that shape the 
everyday wellbeing of populations.  
Outside of advanced industrialized contexts, religious practice is especially likely to 
be oriented toward this-worldly concerns of social life. Among the most rapidly growing 
religious groups, for example, are those that espouse a “prosperity gospel” that links spiritual 
and material blessings (Miller, Sargeant, and Flory 2013). Part of the larger family of groups 
dubbed Pentecostal, their emphasis on spiritual gifts and otherworldly rewards would seem to 
predict the opposite of economic or social activism in this world. Rather than channeling 
followers toward progress, they may merely assuage the pains of the neoliberal market with 
otherworldly promises. Like Barro and McCleary (2003), Woodberry (2006) suggests that the 
emphasis on attending multiple religious services and giving significant sums to the work of 
the church are opportunity costs that may weigh against more productive forms of time and 
money investment and diminish wealth accumulation.  
Other observers have pointed to a more Weberian interpretation, looking for the 
indirect effects of participation in such groups. They claim that the “born again” experience 
introduces a sense of rupture with the past that often allows a range of new behaviors and 
relationships to emerge (Droogers 2001). Individuals who choose a new religious loyalty are 
exercising the kind of agency and independence from traditional communities required in 
modern economies. In the multiple African case studies Freeman (2012) has collected, it is 
apparent that NGOs may provide needed technical training, but it is Pentecostal religion that 
can move a smallholder farmer from a life entangled in close-knit family and community and 
traditional politico-ritual structures to values and practices conducive to becoming an 
individualist, strategic, profit-maximizing agent. Economic success may also be facilitated by 
the lifestyle practices often encouraged in Pentecostal communities—abstaining from 
alcohol, devotion to a monogamous family, hard work, financial planning, and the like (D. 
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Martin 1990; Brusco 1995). Similar patterns of individual ethical transformation can also be 
seen in Islamic spiritual reform programs in Indonesia (Rudnyckyj 2015). These reported 
effects have drawn widespread skepticism, and Woodberry (2006) suggests that they may be 
most demonstrable among those initially escaping poverty and in places with the lowest 
education rates and highest levels of corruption.  
Whatever the indirect connections to economic progress, religious communities and 
religious practices are very often directly involved in providing material assistance—from 
food aid to job referrals—both to their participants and to the surrounding community. Such 
practices are misunderstood by social scientists as an “instrumentalization” of religion, but in 
contexts in which people cannot count on their basic necessities being satisfied, “salvation” 
often refers to being saved from struggles in this world. Rubin, Smilde, and Junge (2014), for 
example, describe the many roles of religion in Latin America’s “zones of crisis,” which they 
define as, “spaces of material deprivation, exclusion, violence, and environmental 
destruction” (9). The empirical studies they examine show how religious beliefs, practices, 
leaders, and institutions have become part of the life strategies that people construct. From 
dealing with violence, oppression, and sickness, to strategies for forming social movements 
or reforming patriarchal gender relations, religion is implicated in the tactics individuals and 
collectivities deploy to confront the difficulties of their everyday lives.  
Still, we need to avoid reifying the “global South” as something essentially different 
from the industrialized North. Global markets and global communication link both material 
challenges and religious strategies across all regions of the world. New and energetic 
religious expressions developed in Asia, Africa, and Latin America are now part of the 
religious landscapes of Europe and North America, carried there by migrants, missionaries, 
and media (Corten and Marshall-Fratani 2001; D. Martin 2002; Olupona and Gemignani 
2007). Advanced industrialized countries have their own extensive zones of crisis, not only in 
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global cities like New York and London, but in forgotten rural areas such as Appalachia and 
the Canadian Maritime Provinces. Ethnographic research in the United States, moreover, 
reveals many of the same strategies linking spiritual life to material wellbeing and health, not 
only among impoverished communities (Sullivan 2011), but also among well-educated and 
privileged populations (McGuire 1988; Ammerman 2013). 
Religious phenomena, then, may be linked to Weberian-style disciplined economic 
behavior and to the strategies of comfort and coping that Marx would have predicted, but also 
to concrete and direct material support. Each local context may include all of the above. For 
example, in her study of Pentecostal groups in Tanzania, Hasu (2012) describes two very 
different, but equally relevant relations between economic and religious life. At Glory of 
Christ Tanzania Church, the poorest of the rural migrants to the city bear testimony to the 
Spirit’s ability to resurrect them from the bewitching spells cast by powerful older kin in the 
communities they left behind. They find in this church both meaningful explanations of their 
lives and means of coping in a bruising economic world. At Efatha Church, also in Dar es 
Salaam, a “prosperity” version of Pentecostalism appeals to, and helps to create more middle 
class followers. They hear about positive thinking, African pride, empowerment, education, 
hard work and planning; and they see the vast business and institutional enterprises supported 
by church leaders as evidence and inspiration. Even within similar religious belief systems, 
then, the spiritual world is intertwined in economic lives in different ways, patterns that must 
be understood if the wellbeing of those communities is to be addressed. 
The same careful analysis must accompany attempts to understand the role of religion 
in women’s educational and economic activities. As we have argued in Section 16.2 of this 
chapter, conservative beliefs in virtually all religious traditions can be mobilized to keep 
women in subservient positions, and tragedies such as the shooting of Malala Yousafzai 
reinforce the reality of the threats that women face in many parts of the world. Economic and 
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social progress is unlikely when women are kept from education, healthcare, and productive 
contributions to their communities. Thus, movements to advance the rights of women have 
often existed in adversarial relationships with conservative religious movements and leaders 
(e.g., Bradley and Kirmani 2015). Those same women, however, frequently see the efforts of 
largely-secular development organizations as irrelevant at best or colonial impositions at 
worst (Chowdhury 2009). Misunderstandings abound. 
What rights movements often hear and reject is the patriarchal rhetoric of 
conservative religions, but there is sometimes a different reality beyond the words. For 
example, Gooren’s research in Guatemala demonstrates that Evangelical churches often 
provide women with opportunities for leadership, new networks of support for 
entrepreneurship, and more economically-productive and attentive husbands (Gooren 2011). 
Other research shows that in practice women can use seemingly patriarchal religious beliefs 
as a way to gain authority over men and consolidate their commitment to the household 
(Griffith 1997, Smilde 1997). This suggests that progress requires attention both to the 
specific religious beliefs in question and to the religious networks in which they are 
embedded. Theological arguments and religious officials may be important, but it is often 
religion-in-practice that provides significant points of convergence with human rights and 
economic assistance agendas (ter Haar 2011b). Building bridges across that cultural and 
religious divide is a necessary task if outside support is to be effective in enabling women 
(and men) to participate in building the economic strength of their communities. Local 
religious leaders can, in fact, be development allies—even interpreting and translating new 
technologies—if they are included in the conversation (Bompani and Smith 2013). 
Access to finance requires equally careful assessment and an eye toward pragmatic 
compromise. Finance is critical to participation in the global economy, and religious beliefs 
are sometimes at the root of self-exclusion from this form of economic activity. Mohseni-
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Cheraghlou (2015) shows, for example, that Muslim-dominant countries in the Middle East 
and North Africa have the highest rates (10 percent) of citing religious reasons for avoiding 
formal banking institutions. What his research also shows, however, is that higher 
concentrations of sharia-compliant financial services increase overall participation in 
banking. A religious obstacle may also have a religious solution. 
16.5.2 Religion and NGOs: Pathways to partnerships 
Critical reflection on the relationship between less-developed and economically-
dominant parts of the world inevitably raises the on-going realities of colonialism. It has 
often been noted that the colonial sword was accompanied by the cross, with today’s 
postcolonial world still bearing the religious imprint of that earlier era. As “development” and 
“aid” programs emerged in the second half of the twentieth century, the religious missionary 
impulse was explicitly rejected by most agents of progress. Religion was relegated to the 
realm of private individual preferences and seen as irrelevant to economic and political 
agendas (Tomalin 2013). As a result, Marshall claims, in spite of “much overlap and many 
synergies, the two worlds (development and faith) have largely operated in separate 
universes" (Marshall 2012: 193). The result is a de facto secularizing agenda that 
accompanies the work of most of the world’s agencies of economic development, an agenda 
that is often experienced as alien to the lives of the people whose wellbeing is at stake. 
Without genuine embeddedness in local cultures, including the religious ways of those 
cultures, efforts at changes in economic, health, and educational patterns have often proved 
short-lived (Jones 2012; Watkins and Swidler 2013). 
Still, the role of faith-based organizations (FBOs) in health and development is 
difficult to ignore. Organizations from every faith tradition have entered relief and 
development work and are among the largest donor entities (G. Clarke 2008; Deacon and 
Tomalin 2015). Such work is hardly new, as religious traditions have long enshrined 
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practices such as zakat (one of Islam’s five “pillars”) that institutionalize support by religious 
practitioners for the material wellbeing of their communities. In some cases that humanitarian 
support is limited to fellow believers, but Gooren (2011) found otherwise: among 
development groups in Guatemala aid freely crossed sectarian (and non-religious) lines.  
Inevitably, this humanitarian impulse has come with political strings attached. State 
aid agencies are frequently assumed to be acting with foreign policy goals in mind. FBOs, as 
well, often mix humanitarian assistance and political change, both repressive and progressive. 
Janine Clark (2008) has examined the role of the Islamic Center Charity Society, the semi-
autonomous charitable arm of the Muslim Brotherhood and one of the largest NGOs in 
Jordan. Its work includes establishing schools, colleges, clinics, and training centers (that 
serve a mostly-middle class clientele), along with providing direct aid to people in poverty. 
Its ability to engage issues of women’s rights is more limited, a restriction that results from 
both its conservative religious milieu and the authoritarian state context in which it works. 
Assessing or working alongside such faith-based development organizations requires careful 
questions about the populations to which they have access and the practical assistance they 
can provide, along with a clear-sighted assessment of the political and religious constraints 
that may limit the work. The effects of religion on economic wellbeing involve both the 
spiritual beliefs and practices of the groups in question and the religious and political 
infrastructure. 
16.5.3 Religion and education 
Nowhere is this clearer than in education. As the authors of Chapter 19 argue, 
education is central to pursuing individual wellbeing and social progress, and religions 
throughout the world—not just in developing countries—are significant providers of 
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education at all levels.22 Protestants everywhere, with their emphasis on individual reading of 
scripture, have been especially vigorous in establishing schools that extend education beyond 
the elites (Woodberry 2012). Until the mid-twentieth century, education in British colonies 
was largely in the hands of missionaries (Smyth 2004), and postcolonial regimes in Africa 
and the Middle East often simply nationalized the existing religious schools (Sharkey 2012). 
The effects of this infrastructure remain significant. 
Different religious traditions are involved in establishing schools. In Indonesia in 
2007, 13 percent of all students were enrolled in Islamic schools. These include both 
pesantren (traditionalist boarding schools) and madrasas (modernist day schools). Since the 
1970s, state initiatives to modernize and standardize the general curriculum at madrasas and 
pesantren have produced a thriving, mostly privately financed infrastructure of religious 
schools which feeds students to higher education as well as training them for a variety of 
vocations (Lukens-Bull 2001; Azyumardi, Afrianty, and Hefner 2007). They have long 
integrated religious education and general education, and are generally more affordable for 
rural and poor students than national schools. Interestingly they weathered the Asian financial 
crisis between 1997 and 2001 without the drop in enrollment experienced by other schools 
(Azyumardi et al. 2007).  
Some religious schools can be sites of resistance to progressive change, and careful 
assessments are always in order. On balance, however, religious schools are likely partners in 
increasing the economic and civic skills of a population and reaching its most disadvantaged 
citizens. For example, rigorous case comparisons across Latin America, Africa, and Asia 
demonstrate both higher accessibility and equal or higher test performance for students in 
faith-based schools (Barrera-Osorio, Patrinos, and Wodon 2009).  
                                                        
22 The World Bank, among others, attempts to provide comprehensive data on the educational capacities of the 
world’s nations. While it is usually possible to track “private” providers, religious providers are not tracked as a 
separate category. 
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15.5.4 Religion and health 
Religious capacity is also present in the realm of health promotion and care, but is 
often surrounded by controversy, raising difficult issues ranging from family planning, to 
immunization, to female genital mutilation, and end of life issues. Public health providers are 
frequently horrified by the harm that they see -- harm that must not be ignored. As Duff and 
Buckingham point out, “Though public sector and faith-linked entities bring distinctive assets 
that help achieve health goals, ideological challenges present barriers to collaboration and 
need careful negotiation on both sides” (2015: 1787). Confronting the seeming impasse 
between secular health professionals and faith-based providers, a series of essays in The 
Lancet (July 2015) has offered an evidence-based way forward, based on identifying 
common goals and values. Tomkins and her co-authors (2015: 1782) argue that clarifying 
areas of real disagreement can allow cooperation elsewhere. Not all partnerships will be 
advisable, but if advancing health goals is critical to poverty reduction, the full range of 
available health care providers is needed to meet the challenge. 
An accurate assessment of overall religious capacity and impact is difficult, however, 
since religious organizations are generally not distinguished as a separate category in NGO 
reporting. The “Religious Health Assets” project represents a pioneering effort to integrate 
religion into the study of health systems, identifying all the organizations and resources that 
are seeking to improve the health of a population (Olivier et al. 2015). Olivier and her 
colleagues concluded that the extent of health care provision provided by faith-based groups 
in Africa is often overstated, with estimates ranging from 5 to 45 percent. However, they did 
find some evidence that faith-based health care providers take care of a slightly higher 
percentage of the poor compared to their public and private equivalents (Olivier et al. 2015: 
1770-1771). Religious providers seem to excel in mobilizing and supporting volunteers, in 
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prioritizing poor, marginalized, and hard to reach populations, and in developing innovative 
progressive fee structures that require the poor to pay little. 
Responses to HIV offer a case study of the complexity of the relationship between 
religion and health. In the early days of the epidemic, religious leaders in Africa painted 
HIV/AIDS as God’s anger and not a matter for either compassion or education. However, as 
serious campaigns began on the continent, churches joined others, particularly the state, to 
lend support to AIDS victims. Many churches established programs of home support and 
took on the care of orphans. They also developed both local health care delivery systems and 
informal modes of mutual education aimed at prevention (Trinitapoli and Weinreb 2012). 
That experience helped to inform responses to the Ebola crisis. A team of medical 
anthropologists contributed their findings on the cultural significance of burial practices, and 
religious leaders in affected countries were asked to define what is meant by “dignified 
burial.” The result was a new World Health Organization burial protocol23 that Marshall and 
Smith (2015: e25) describe as “vital in halting spread of the disease and laying foundations 
for community trust. In many respects, the protocol was a game changer in the overall 
trajectory of crisis response.” Careful local assessment and consultation led to a life-saving 
partnership between public health providers and communities at risk. 
Similar patterns have been evident in Latin America. Seffner et al. (2011) looked 
closely at a health service engagement between the Brazilian Catholic Church and the 
Brazilian National STD/AIDS Program—at first glance not a likely collaboration. The 
National STD/AIDS Program established condom use as its principal measure of prevention, 
while the official stance of Brazil’s Catholic Church is to oppose condom use which it sees as 
promoting sexual promiscuity. However, the Catholic Church is hardly monolithic—indeed 
                                                        
23 For more information see https://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/ebola/safe-burial-protocol/en/. 
Consultation with religious and community leaders provided the basis for changes in practice that would 
increase safety while honoring tradition. 
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one Brazilian Catholic theologian has written a “theology of prevention” which has been 
widely used to support care for people with HIV or AIDS. In practice, the Casa Fonte 
Colombo, a Catholic organization, provides medical and psychological attention, spiritual 
guidance, massage therapy, donated clothing, bathrooms, and spaces for rest. Their services 
aid predominantly poor, HIV positive patients, and are an important source of education on 
how to live with the disease, including a prominently displayed and artfully decorated bowl 
of condoms for the taking. Here a local Catholic institution is able to work with secular 
governmental institutions by developing a grassroots working arrangement enacted without 
explicit public statements. 
As in many other instances, religion as lived in everyday practice may not follow the 
lines apparent in official pronouncements. It is also the case that health goes far beyond what 
happens in medical institutions. Throughout the world, definitions of health and of health 
promotion are often not only physical but spiritual. This parallels an increasing recognition 
that “alternative” forms of healing can and do exist alongside highly-developed forms of 
scientific medicine. Both states and insurers have recognized the advantages of broad-based 
pragmatic partnerships.  
16.5.5 Religion, welfare, and healthcare in Europe and the United States 
Economic, physical, and social wellbeing are not simply matters of concern in the 
“global South.” Across the developed world, markets do not always treat vulnerable people 
well. It is true that states have attempted to fill the gaps, even the playing field, and regulate 
markets, but neither states nor markets have yet succeeded in providing an equitable and 
comprehensive set of provisions that allow all their citizens to flourish. Among the providers 
filling the gaps are religiously affiliated voluntary organizations. 
This is as true in Europe as it is in the United States, but the division of labor is 
different. In (then) Western Europe, the post-war settlement led to the development of the 
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welfare state—or more accurately welfare states—a shift in which the state assumed the 
primary role for the education, social protection, welfare and healthcare of its citizens. Post-
war aspirations were high and lasted until the 1970s, when the effects of the oil crisis and 
shifting demographics (notably a rise in the number of older people) led to retrenchment. 
Multiple voluntary agencies emerged to fill the gaps, among them a series of religious 
providers—modestly in those parts of Europe where the welfare state was relatively well 
funded, and more comprehensively further south (in the Mediterranean countries) where it 
was rudimentary right from the start. Bäckström and associates (Bäckström and Davie 2010; 
Bäckström, Davie, Edgardh, and Pettersson 2011) map these changes and the questions that 
emerge in consequence. The latter include the appropriateness and effectiveness of religious 
providers in this field (see also Beaumont and Cloke 2012). The response of the populations 
themselves was clearly articulated. Europeans would prefer a comprehensive and publicly 
funded welfare state. They know, however, that this is not realizable in the present economic 
climate, and it is better that the churches and related organizations fill the gaps than to have 
nothing at all. The situation, moreover, is becoming more rather than less acute as growing 
migrant populations provoke difficult questions of entitlement alongside problems of 
scarcity. 
In the United States, the welfare state is much less comprehensive than in Europe and 
there is no state church. The resulting system of voluntary religious organizing means that 
each religious group is responsible both for its own maintenance and for whatever beneficent 
activities it may choose to undertake; and a remarkable consensus exists that religious 
congregations should voluntarily contribute to the common good (Ammerman 2005: ch. 7). 
In the evangelical Protestant culture of the United States, providing assistance to a 
“deserving” needy person is a personal virtue, and the state has no special place in the 
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enactment of this sacred duty (Chaves 1999; Ebaugh, Chafetz, and Pipes 2006; Quadagno 
and Rohlinger 2009). The result is a weak welfare state and a strong charitable sector.  
The resulting contributions by faith-based organizations are impressive. In 2006 it 
was estimated that $50 billion was spent on basic welfare provision by faith-based 
organizations, with government expenditures on similar services amounting to only $138 
billion (Stritt 2008). In other sectors of the welfare state—housing, education, health—the 
state is a much more dominant player. Social welfare in the United States, then, has long been 
delivered through a complicated mix of explicitly religious resources (money, volunteers, and 
space), secular voluntary contributions, and state-funded programmatic effort (Bane, Coffin, 
and Thiemann 2000).  
16.5.6 Strategic partnerships for wellbeing 
Economic wellbeing, health, and education are goals of social progress that are shared 
by most religious groups, even as there are many places where religious ideas and practices 
are at odds with secular norms. States, NGOs, and faith communities all have a role to play. 
Establishing effective partnerships requires a holistic approach. In practical terms strategic 
disagreements are best approached at the local level, to encourage both mutual understanding 
and pragmatic solutions, as in the case of the Ebola crisis. Faith-linked organizations are 
pervasive throughout the world and are especially effective in reaching the most vulnerable 
populations. The health, education, and economic wellbeing of societies depend on every 
sector of society being positively engaged. Faith-linked organizations are neither the sole 
solution nor irrelevant to progress. 
16.6. Care for the earth 
Most spiritual belief systems address the relationship between humans and the world 
around them, including non-humans of all kinds. Religious beliefs and practices are therefore 
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expressed both within and through the physical spaces in which they are embedded—whether 
these be local places of worship or the earth itself. For this reason, diverse religious thinkers 
and religious communities have addressed the spiritual significance of human (material) 
action—whether routine or globally consequential.  
Environmental concerns, including pollution, public health, and decreasing 
biodiversity, have inspired religious commentary since the late 1960s. More recently, 
religious leaders have begun to address climate change. Despite the disparity of religious 
beliefs and traditions, a common theme is clear: concern for the environment involves 
fundamental principles that implicate not merely human relationships with non-humans, but 
human relationships with each other. It follows that concrete activities (such as recycling, or 
replanting forests) can be defined as necessary spiritual acts.  
Prominent figures in the major world faiths are well placed to articulate 
environmental ethics for global audiences. Indigenous leaders, as well, speak with authority 
granted by long-standing connections to particular locations. All share a conviction that 
secular laws, science, and markets are insufficient to bring about lasting change. Instead, they 
advocate a personal and collective reconsideration of human obligations to each other and to 
the earth itself. Religious communities can therefore become key organizing centers and 
potent locations for reimagining how people can live differently on the earth—or, as Chapter 
22 puts it, how society could be otherwise. 
16.6.1 The intrinsic spiritual significance of the environment 
Religious engagement with the environment—sometimes called eco-theology—
involves a re-evaluation of sacred literature and/or oral traditions that speak to the spiritual 
significance of the natural world. To understand the difference between religious 
environmental activism and more secular approaches, it is vital to understand the ways that 
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different religious organizations frame environmental activism within their own faith 
traditions and sacred texts. 
In 1967, Lynn White Jr. hypothesized that: “[B]y destroying pagan animism, 
Christianity made it possible to exploit nature in a mood of indifference to the feelings of 
natural objects” (White 1967: 1205). By suggesting a direct relationship between Christian 
belief and harmful environmental practices, White argued that Christianity itself was 
implicated in environmental crises. The link between Christian beliefs and anti-
environmentalism has been most visible in the skepticism of American evangelicals to 
climate science. Many such critics are motivated by “end-times theology,” arguing that no 
environmental action is necessary because the world is witnessing the “end times” prophesied 
in the Bible (Barker and Bearce 2013). Other groups link climate science with scientific work 
that they find unacceptable, such as evolution, or unethical, such as stem cell research.  
These conservative Christian voices should not, however, be taken for the whole. 
Even within Evangelicalism there are significant differences. At the grassroots, Evangelicals’ 
ideas differ only slightly from other white middle class religious groups in the United States, 
and younger generations are increasingly likely to voice pro-environmental views (Funk and 
Alper 2016; Smith and Johnson 2010). Furthermore, Evangelicals outside the U.S. may differ 
sharply on this point; the Cape Town Commitment, a document created by the international 
Evangelical Christian community, recognizes environmental activists as having a “missional 
calling” (Lausanne Movement 2011: 14). 
Engaging and interpreting sacred texts in light of contemporary concerns is for many 
faith leaders a necessary foundation for action. For Christians and Muslims, an important 
focus has been a re-evaluation of scriptural claims that humans are given “dominion over the 
earth” by a creator. The Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, in one of the earliest Christian 
writings on this subject, offered the following assessment: 
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Human beings and the environment form a seamless garment of existence, a complex 
fabric that we believe is fashioned by God. It follows that to commit a crime against 
the natural world is a sin…How we treat the earth and all of creation defines the 
relationship that each of us has with God” (Bartholomew1998: 4). 
Similarly, in the papal encyclical Laudato Si’ Pope Francis stresses that the gift of creation 
requires a strong sense of responsibility toward both humans and non-humans. “Dominion 
over nature”, he argues, is not free rein to indulge in exploitation but instead a responsibility 
to protect divine creation which Christians understand as a gift to all humans, including 
future generations (Francis 2015: 160-161). For other commentators, metaphors such as 
“Christian stewardship” offer effective models of virtuous behavior (Bartholomew 1998; 
Moody and Achenbaum 2014,). 
Islamic thinkers compare the special obligations of the wealthy toward the rest of 
human society with human obligations toward the natural world to argue for better care of the 
environment. Just as people with superior gifts (which are assumed to derive from God) are 
obliged within Islam to support the less prosperous, so are spiritually superior humans 
obligated to protect non-humans. Protecting creation is thus understood as a spiritually 
important act (Haq 2001; Amery 2001; Islamic Foundation for Ecology and Environmental 
Sciences 2015). It is worth noting, however, that both Christians and Muslims endorse a 
special role for humans, in contrast to biocentrism which does not (Haq 2001: 154; Francis 
2015: 88).  
Islamic, Christian and Jewish traditions also find environmental problems of spiritual 
importance because such problems are understood to be symptomatic of breakdowns in 
healthy human relationships and ways of life. Environmental justice makes care for the 
environment a necessary dimension of caring for the poor, since environmental problems 
disproportionately harm the poorest and most vulnerable members of society (Haq 2001: 152-
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153; Francis 2015: 116-120). Intergenerational equity, or the requirement that present 
generations have a duty to make sure that future generations thrive, is a dimension of 
environmental justice that resonates widely. Pope Francis, for example, urges Catholics to 
“extend the boundaries of solidarity through time and across species” (Francis 2015: 103-
120). Numerous Christian Evangelical groups evoke intergenerational justice as the basis for 
re-evaluating dismissive attitudes toward the environment.24 Both faith-based and secular 
groups can find a foundation for action in orientations toward intergenerational justice.  
Other traditions (including Buddhism and many indigenous spiritualities) base 
environmental behavior on their belief that humans and non-humans exist in meaningful 
relationships with one another (Dalai Lama 1995; Kawagley 2006; Swearer 2006; Mavhunga 
2014; Caroll 2015). Many indigenous cosmologies define expansive kinship networks 
between humans and non-humans, which are grounded in reciprocal responsibilities and 
feelings of gratitude toward non-human agents (Kawharu 2000; Mavhunga 2014; Carroll 
2015). Such kinship networks strongly shape interactions with the wider environment. For 
example, among Maori, responsibilities for what non-Maori might call environmental 
resources are deeply embedded in kinship relations between human groups. No decisions 
bearing on one can be taken without reference to the other (Kawharu 2000: 352). In this 
holistic worldview extended relationships and shared understandings of accountability and 
reciprocal responsibilities motivate Maori to balance the needs of humans and non-humans, 
and thus provide for the spiritual and physical wellbeing of all.  
Despite significant differences in spiritual belief systems, many religious groups share 
important fundamental beliefs that make collaboration on environmental issues both with 
each other and with secular groups entirely feasible. They each see environmental problems 
                                                        
24 The Evangelical Environmental Network is one such, in an initiative known as “creation care.” For more 
information see www.creationcare.org.  
85 
 
as directly connected to problematic social relationships, and they call for environmental 
action as part of an ethical obligation to maintain balanced interdependence. The common 
frame of reference is holism which offers a foundation for shared perspectives that bridge 
secular and spiritual orientations, allowing for common, mutually beneficial, and mutually 
respectful action. As Chapter 4 has demonstrated, pursuit of a sustainable planet will require 
not only the best thinking of ethicists and philosophers about the common good, but also 
ideas grounded in the world’s religious traditions. 
16.6.2 Virtuous behavior and the challenge of climate change 
For most religious and spiritual leaders solving environmental problems requires 
collective and individual transformation. Calls for changed attitudes and ways of thinking are 
significant elements in this discourse, and are aimed at activating changed behavior. Taking a 
verse from the Qur’an, the “Islamic Declaration on Global Climate Change” enjoins Muslims 
not to “strut arrogantly on the earth” (Islamic Foundation for Ecology and Environmental 
Sciences 2015: 8). The Cape Town Commitment calls for a spirit of repentance for the 
“destruction, waste and pollution of the earth’s resources and our collusion in the toxic 
idolatry of consumerism” (Lausanne Movement 2011: 14). Pope Francis encourages 
hopefulness and commitment as an antidote to despair or fatalism (Francis 2015: 44). These 
religious communities have made the fight against climate change integral to their views of a 
more satisfying spiritual life. They contrast such changes with conventional tools of 
environmental action such as law and regulation. Pope Francis argues that, lacking deeper 
convictions, regulation becomes something individuals seek to obstruct, remove, or avoid 
(Francis 2015: 91).  
There is some evidence to support the idea that spiritual foundations for 
environmental activism can be particularly effective. For example, in a forest rehabilitation 
and watershed protection project in West Sumatra, local religious leaders were educated by 
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visiting Islamic teachers on the place of environment in Islam, and Islamic scholars, or 
ulama, were invited to deliver sermons about water conservation. The project team found that 
religious education noticeably increased interest in water issues, especially among women, 
who particularly embraced Islamic principles of environmental care. Secular organizers 
argued that the combination of religious and environmental education provided a stronger 
social foundation for sustainable change than environmental education alone (McKay 2013: 
85). Such cooperative efforts have become widespread.  
One group, Interfaith Power and Light has been notably successful in reaching North 
American communities who might otherwise have been indifferent to environmental issues.25 
The collective efforts of their 18,000 American congregations help to generate broad 
religious support for environmental, especially climate, activism. Simple projects like 
providing energy-efficient appliances to churches, temples and mosques are rendered 
simultaneously religious and pragmatic (Bingham 2016). In Latin America, the implications 
of climate change for social justice have increased collaborations between secular and faith-
based organizations.26 Cooperation on climate between indigenous organizations and 
Catholic and Protestant groups (an example of “street-level ecumenism”) has even eased 
long-standing tensions between religious groups, a welcome by-product. 
Indigenous peoples, many of whom live on the front lines of climate change, have 
gone further. They demanded representation at the Framework Convention on Climate 
Change and participated in the development of the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals in 
2015. The First Nations organization Idle No More protested the Keystone XL pipeline in 
Canada and the United States in order to gain sovereignty over their lands, and protect the 
                                                        
25 For more information, see www.interfaithpowerandlight.org. 
26 See www.wola.org/es/node/5557. 
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environment from both the immediate threat of oil spills, and the longer-term threat of 
climate damage.27  
16.6.3 Epistemic challenges and new ways of living 
For many indigenous peoples, the very framing of environment and resources as 
something separate from humans constitutes the core problem. Such questioning of the 
philosophical basis on which the material world has been built is a central plank of spiritual 
environmental action. In many faith traditions, individuals are encouraged to turn their backs 
on the materialism that grounds the global economic system. Such radical calls for change are 
tempered by the recognition that consumption practices are conditioned by entrenched 
economic systems, scientific aims, and technological infrastructures, which may be difficult 
to dispense with or change (Francis 2015: 75-85). Human embeddedness in complex 
technical systems, for example electrical grids, constrains individual action (Pritchard 2011). 
More deeply, environmental planning is clearly rooted in complex political relationships 
(Jasanoff 2005). Thus spiritual leaders are left with a thorny question: how can human 
societies go about making significant change? 
Pope Francis encourages critical understanding of technology and materialism, 
explicitly rejecting a “technological fix” mentality for environmental problems (e.g. 
geoengineering). Applying more technology, he argues, is insufficient for grappling with 
integrated social, environmental, and spiritual problems. Indeed such fixes may exacerbate 
the impulse to dominate and fail to tackle the social problems at the core of climate change 
(Francis 2015: 75-85).28 Islamic thinkers, such as Seyyed Hossein Nasr have called for 
comprehensive rethinking of the science and technology enterprise by rebuilding the 
epistemological foundation of science in a way guided by Islamic belief (Nasr 1991, 2010). 
                                                        
27 For more information see http://idlenomore.ca. 
28 There is an interesting resonance here with Ulrich Beck’s Risk Society (1992). 
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Although Nasr’s thinking is controversial, many Muslim scientists and engineers have argued 
that belief has the power to change the character of technoscience (Razak and Majeed 1997; 
Amery 2001; Lotfalian 2004). Religious thinkers therefore may embrace more 
“revolutionary” change (Jasanoff and Kim 2015) than some might expect. As advocates seek 
progress in sustainability and environmental justice, revolutionary questioning such as this 
can constitute common ground for secular and faith-based communities. 
The efforts of indigenous activists to remove damaging technologies such as dams or 
mines from their traditional lands has also raised awareness of the power relations embedded 
in these technologies (Simpson 2008; Voyles 2015). Such projects harm extended kinship 
relationships, and alienate indigenous peoples from sacred spaces. Furthermore, the tendency 
of megaprojects to benefit distant rather than local populations, belies justifications based on 
“the common good” (Groenveldt 2003; Swainson and McGregor 2008; Hall and Branford 
2012). Activists have pointed out that economic and health problems in indigenous 
communities are significantly exacerbated when the institutions and philosophical 
frameworks of dominant political authorities are the only ways such problems are addressed 
(Smith 2012). Implementing alternatives to prevailing models, however, can be politically 
difficult to achieve (Kawharu 2000; Carroll 2015).  
Legal scholar Rebecca Tsosie, drawing on the work of Miranda Fricker, has 
highlighted the importance of epistemic injustice, the failure of legal systems to give weight 
to indigenous knowledge and cosmological belief systems (Tsosie 2012: 12). She highlights 
the injustices that result when U.S. courts fail to recognize tribal members as valid culture 
experts, as for example when they found no cultural harm to Native Alaskan tribes from the 
Exxon Valdez oil spill, which made indigenous ways of life effectively impossible, or when 
the Hopi and Navajo were not permitted to stop the pumping of treated sewage onto a sacred 
mountain (Tsosie 2012: 12). Tribal understandings of meaningful human/non-human 
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relationships were legally rejected on the basis that “true belief” was a purely mental 
construct, and thus no change in the material world could threaten it. Fighting for 
epistemological justice is therefore central to maintaining holistic ways of life. 
By challenging the character and not just the consequences of human materialism, 
religious actors again may find common ground with secular groups who also push for 
reassessments of the way that humans live. 
16.6.4 Conclusion 
Commentators such as George Rupp (2001) insist that religious beliefs are too diverse 
and internally inconsistent, to offer sufficient intellectual resources on which to ground 
environmental action. Evidence suggests otherwise. Religious interpretations of the earth and 
faith-based environmental activism share much with secular groups, including techniques for 
raising consciousness, concerns with environmental justice, and challenges to foundational 
ways of thinking that contribute to environmental and human harm. Religious leaders are 
mining their traditions to inspire changes in behavior and thinking that are harmonious with, 
if philosophically distinct from, purely secular work. Successful challenges to entrenched 
systems of power, knowledge, and technology can gain direction and legitimacy in 
cooperation with faith communities. 
16.7. Themes and implications: An action toolkit 
Progress toward the flourishing of persons, households, societies, and the planet 
requires progress in religion and in its capacities to contribute social and cultural goods. It 
also requires better understanding of the place of religion in the late modern world. 
Encouraging such advances has been the primary goal of this chapter. Five interconnected 
themes have run through the previous sections: the persistence of religion in the twenty-first 
century; the importance of context in discerning outcomes; the need for improved cultural 
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competence and religious literacy; the significance of religion in initiating change; and the 
benefits of well-judged partnerships. Each of these themes carries implications for action, 
which are spelled out in this section 
16.7.1 The persistence of religion 
At the outset of this chapter we laid out evidence of the continuing significance of 
religion in the modern world. Specifically, a very high percentage of the global population 
claims some sort of identification with a religion, a percentage that is growing rather than 
declining overall. From this evidence we argue that religion is persistent—a term chosen with 
care to signify that it is neither vanishing nor resurgent. And as a pervasive aspect of human 
cultures religion is to be understood and respected. Social scientists, newly sensitized to a 
phenomenon that had been ignored for much of the twentieth century, are prone to “discover” 
religion where it has always been, but careful attention to religious demography in different 
parts of the world reveals a constantly changing array of presence and absence. Religion also 
takes new forms in late modernity—as indeed does everything else. Keeping this in mind and 
starting from observations of religion in everyday lives and local contexts, we have attempted 
here to analyze the impact of religion and its relevance to social progress in a wide variety of 
fields. 
16.7.1.1 Implications for action: 
Researchers, policy-makers, and activists should 
 Start from the assumption that the presence of religious belief and practice is 
to be expected and that it is often a significant factor in whatever changes take 
place in a society. 
 Support freedom for religious (and non-religious) identification, belief, and 
practice as a fundamental human right. 
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 Reject a simplistic distinction between progressive secularism and reactive 
religion, which has the effect of reinforcing precisely the reactionary reflex it 
sets out to condemn (Juergensmeyer 2015). 
16.7.2 The importance of context 
Throughout this chapter, a consistent conclusion emerges: the dangers of 
generalization. There is no single phenomenon—“religion”—that can be said to act in 
uniform ways across contexts. Whether it be in terms of households, of diversity, of 
democracy, of conflict, of peace-making, of welfare, of healthcare, or of the earth itself, the 
role of religion must be examined on its own terms and in local cultural context. In each and 
every case, religious beliefs, practices, and communities must be understood in particular 
historical, economic, political, and cultural trajectories. Careful attention to religion as 
practiced, not just to religion as doctrine or proclamation, is essential to achieving this level 
of local understanding. It is also critical to identifying potential partners for action on the one 
hand, and signs of potentially destructive conflict on the other. In short, the detail matters. 
The social sciences lend themselves to this task. It is the rigorous, but nonetheless sensitive, 
inquiry into the myriad aspects of religion and religiousness which lead first to critical 
appraisals and then to effective recommendations for policy. 
16.7.2.1 Implications for action: 
Researchers, policy-makers, and activists should 
 Engage in careful and thorough investigations to determine religion’s diverse 
forms in any given situation. Trusted local informants, along with scholarly 
experts, can be critical partners in interpretation, as can broad surveys that tap 
the full range of belief and practice, not just the loudest voices. 
 Assess the degree to which religious factors may or may not be significant in a 
given context. 
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 Recognize the internal diversity of all religious traditions, thereby avoiding 
generalizations that may alienate potential allies and inhibit the search for 
pragmatic solutions. 
 Be aware that “official” authorities and teachings may protect existing powers 
and hide important sites of innovation. This implies looking past formal 
pronouncements to everyday practices, especially in indigenous and other 
marginalized groups. 
16.7.3 The need for cultural competence and religious literacy 
Both secular experts and religious leaders lack sufficient knowledge of each other’s 
goals and resources. Community workers, politicians, policy-makers, and analysts need new 
kinds of knowledge to make the necessary judgments in this field. Knowledge of religion that 
comes only from media accounts is not sufficient. Within the social sciences, research on 
religion must not be restricted to a specialized subfield. We (all of us) need broad and deep 
pools of expertise to help identify the situations in which religious ideas and practices have 
become dangerous, as well as the places where creative synergies are possible. Basic 
religious literacy is a minimum standard for civic discourse and collective decision-making. 
Responsibility for that literacy will be allocated variously in different societies to educational 
systems, public programs, professional schools, and religious groups themselves. It is, 
however, an essential starting point. That said, the mutual knowledge that will make the most 
difference is likely to be gained in specific local contexts as diverse parties work together on 
concrete issues.  
16.7.3.1 Implications for action: 
Researchers, policy-makers, and activists should 
 Insist that professional education in all fields establish basic religious literacy 
as a standard for cultural competence. 
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 Cultivate on-going ties with religion scholars who can bring the necessary 
expertise to bear in any given situation. No single expert—secular or 
religious—should be expected to have all of knowledge required. 
 Encourage funders and reviewers of social science research to be alert to 
opportunities to expand existing research programs, in order to include 
attention to the role of religions in political, economic, and household life. 
 Take advantage of common projects to expand mutual knowledge and 
understanding and report on those findings to larger professional audiences. 
16.7.4 The significance of religion in initiating change 
Religions have—and always have had—powerful potential as initiators of progressive 
social change. Think for example of the initiatives to condemn slavery both in Europe and the 
United States. That impulse remains. It is true that religion’s inherent potential for disrupting 
the status quo can lead to destructive movements; this should not be minimized. But by the 
same token, we need to recognize creative interventions by religious activists—initiatives that 
span democratization, peace-building, and ecology, among others. Religions encourage their 
participants to imagine the world as it could be and to act in ways that can make it so. When 
this happens, it arises from the power of religious ideas to motivate, of religious practices to 
offer transformative ways of life, of religious communities to mobilize, and of religious 
leaders and symbols to embody transcendent calls to action. All of that can be put to either 
good or ill. Attention to the specific social mechanisms of religious life has revealed, for 
instance, both the everyday structures of patriarchy that restrict women’s freedom and the 
religious ideas and practices women can employ to resist. And attention to religious 
organizations and networks has pointed not only toward different points of departure but to 
tremendously expanded capacity and reach for healthcare and development in Africa.  
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16.7.4.1 Implications for action: 
Researchers, policy-makers, and activists should 
 Make room for the specific contributions that religious traditions may bring to 
pursuing social progress, ranging from religious stories and symbols, to 
everyday ritual practices, to recognized local leaders and organizational 
capacity. Each aspect has its own dynamic and potential. 
 Be able to discern the likely value—or at times potential danger—of existing 
religious initiatives in any given area. 
 Assess the degree to which practices may be separable from beliefs. Where 
beliefs seem promising for furthering progress, practices may imply the 
opposite—and vice versa. Cooperation may be possible without full 
agreement, and resistance to detrimental practices may be possible without 
attacking beliefs. 
16.7.5 The benefits of well-judged partnerships 
A stand-out finding running through this chapter is the strategic benefit in well-judged 
partnerships between religious and secular actors. Agencies of many different kinds benefit 
when religion is taken into account, and—where appropriate—when the considerable 
resources of religions are harnessed. Social progress depends on every sector of society—
state, market, civil society, and more. Religion is particularly important in those parts of the 
world where secular agencies, both state and non-state, are for whatever reason eroded, at 
times seriously. In Brazil, for example, a Catholic community center became an ironic ally in 
government efforts to confront HIV/AIDS. In Indonesia, environmental restoration is gaining 
greater reach and effectiveness through collaboration with Muslim groups. In the United 
States and Europe religious charities remain important to the social safety net. And 
throughout the world, efforts toward conflict transformation frequently depend on faith-based 
95 
 
leadership. Whether pursuing human rights or democracy, economic development or 
women’s empowerment, religious partners can bring value to the table. 
It is important, however, to sound a note of caution: Well-judged partnerships benefit 
all the parties involved; ill-judged partnerships are potentially dangerous. Political and social 
science research is essential to discern the precise conditions under which toxic forms of 
religion can join with toxic forms of political life leading to harmful consequences for all 
concerned. Religion can encourage—indeed legitimate—destructive violence at every level 
of society, from the intimate to the global. But that is not the whole story. As the preceding 
sections of this chapter make clear, at times religion is the only force that can break through a 
stalemate, or offer a more hopeful vision of the future. And more immediately it is very often 
religious agencies—along with their secular counterparts—that bring aid to the excluded, 
support to the victims, and encouragement to the peacemakers. 
16.7.5.1 Implications for action: 
Researchers, policy-makers, and activists should 
 Support the efforts of religious leaders, groups, and movements which are working to 
end discrimination and engender greater wellbeing, equality, and opportunity for 
more people. 
 Support initiatives aimed at exposing and countering abuses both within religious 
communities and beyond. 
 Look for overlapping goals, without expecting full agreement. 
 Look for complementary organizational capacities that can be brought to bear on the 
issues in question. 
 Engage with religious partners in debating and evaluating policy initiatives. 
 Bring the expertise of social science to bear on the critical analyses necessary to 
discern both the dangers and the potential of partnerships with religious agencies. 
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In short, we underline the continuing need for research and action that give attention 
to religion. The social progress toward which these volumes point must encompass individual 
and social life as a whole, recognizing religious sensibilities as part of that whole. Critical but 
appreciative assessment is the first step in establishing creative partnerships that include 
religious individuals, organizations and communities as key players in mobilizing for action 
and in debates about the future. They have much to offer—rich resources, significant skills, 
and sites for discussion. Imagining that society might indeed be “other” is a calling shared by 
religious and secular visionaries alike. 
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